Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 2

Article 12

Spring 3-1-2012

“Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory
Small Loan Ordinances
Christopher L. Peterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small
Loan Ordinances, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 893 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol69/iss2/12
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

“Warning: Predatory Lender”—A
Proposal for Candid Predatory Small
Loan Ordinances
Christopher L. Peterson*
Abstract
Over a hundred different local governments around the country
have adopted ordinances restricting small, high-cost loans. This
trend reflects the solid majority of the American public that opposes
the legality of triple-digit interest rate loans and the long historical
tradition of treating payday and car-title lending as a serious civil
offense or even a crime. Nevertheless, perhaps owing to limits on
municipal power, local payday lending law has generated relatively
little scholarship or commentary. This paper describes the existing
local law governing small, high-cost consumer loans and proposes a
more emphatic ordinance that better reflects the policy judgment of
many local leaders and a solid majority of the America public. In
particular, this paper (1) introduces the historical background of
regulation of usurious lending; (2) analyzes the recent growth in local
ordinances attempting to control small, high-cost loans; (3) discusses
the evidence of market failure in the small, high-cost loan market;
(4) proposes a model ordinance requiring that lenders who offer
loans in excess of 45% per annum display a cautionary message that
reads: “Warning: Predatory Lender,” on their street, storefront, and
other on-premises signs; and (5) argues that the well-established
municipal authority over signage provides a solid statutory and
constitutional basis for such a law. An appendix with a model
ordinance suitable for adoption by most local governments follows.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University
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Lynn Drysdale, Jean Ann Fox, Deepak Gupta, Peter B. Haskel, Lyrissa Lidsky,
Tera Peterson, Meghan Sheridan, and Michael Wolf.

893

894

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012)
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................ 894

II. The Law of Predatory Small Loans in Historical
Context .................................................................................... 899
III. Predatory Is as Predatory Does: Inefficiency in
Consumer Finance Markets.................................................. 910
IV. Zoning in the Void: The Local Response to
Predatory Small Loans .......................................................... 932
V. Plainspoken Leadership: A Proposal for
Cautionary Signage Ordinances ........................................... 940
A. Why Forty-Five Percent? Choosing a Clear,
Justified, and Enforceable Bright Line ......................... 943
B. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage
Ordinance Is Not Preempted by State Law .................. 947
C. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage
Ordinance Is Constitutional ........................................... 952
1. The Government Speech Doctrine ........................... 953
2. The Compelled Commercial Speech
Doctrine...................................................................... 959
VI. Conclusion .............................................................................. 968
Appendix A. Model Predatory Small Loan Ordinance ............... 968
I. Introduction
While the heated academic debate over the wisdom of tolerating
triple-digit interest rates for consumer finance continues, there is
one way in which payday and car-title loans remain relatively
uncontroversial. Today, an overwhelming majority of Americans—
about three out of four—support traditional usury law prohibiting
predatory triple-digit interest rate loans.1 In every public ballot
1. See Center for Responsible Lending, Congress Should Cap Interest
Rates: Survey Confirms Public Support for Cracking Down on High-Cost
Lending (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/paydaylending/policy-legislation/congress/interest-rate-survey.pdf (“Three out of four
Americans who expressed an opinion think that Congress should cap interest
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referendum ever conducted on the subject, Americans have
overwhelmingly voted in favor of traditional usury limits on the
interest rates of consumer loans.2 Perhaps surprising in an era of
polarized politics, usurious lenders have lost these ballot measures
in red, blue, and swing states.3 These votes against predatory credit
rates at some level. 72% think that the annual interest rate cap should be no
higher than 36% annually.”). “Only one quarter of those who expressed an
opinion think Congress should not cap interest rates at all.” Id. The telephone
survey reached 1,004 adults in the continental United States. Id. CRL weighted
the sample by age, sex, geographic region, and race to suggest a 95% chance
that the survey results are accurate within 2%. Id.; see also Center for Policy
Entrepreneurship, Poll on Payday Lending Legislation (Feb. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.c-pe.org/download/PaydayLendingReform/PollPaydayLending.pdf
(stating that a weighted sample of 500 Colorado voters found “74% of
respondents are in favor of proposed legislation that will set a cap of 36% on the
interest and fees that a company can charge for payday loans”); Kentucky
Coalition for Responsible Lending, Kentucky Voters Support a 36 Percent Rate
on Payday Loans, Despite Database and Job Loss Threats (2010), available at
http://kyresponsiblelending.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/kcrl_polling_data_fact_
sheet_2-7-11.pdf (stating that a survey of “[n]early 400 voters from 179 cities
and towns across the Commonwealth” found “73% of voters across the
Commonwealth support a 36% APR cap on payday loans”).
2. Ballot measures on usury limits have occurred in Arizona, Montana,
and Ohio. The public voted overwhelmingly in favor of usury limits in all three
states. See Tom Jacobson, Op-ed., GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Great Falls, MT), Jan. 6,
2011 (“Ballot Initiative 164, which took effect Jan. 1, capped the annual interest
rates on payday and car title loans at 36 percent . . . . The measure passed with
72 percent of the vote statewide. It won in every county and House
district . . . .”); Marian McClure & Debbie McCune Davis, Op-ed., Let’s Make
Sure the Sun Sets on Arizona Payday Loans, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2009,
at B5 (“60 percent of Arizona voters soundly rejected 400 percent annual
interest rates on payday loans, when 1.2 million Arizonans rejected the payday
lenders’ Proposition 200. The lenders spent more than $14 million trying to fool
the people. The voters saw through their scam.”); Editorial, Ohio Voters Prove
that a Good Idea Can Beat $22 Million, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), Nov. 6, 2008
Voters handed the industry a deservedly humiliating defeat, rejecting
one of the slickest and most misleading campaigns in the state this
election season by a ratio of roughly 2-to-1. The defeat of the lenders
is particularly gratifying, as their efforts carefully concealed the
industry’s goal to regain the license to charge excessive interest rates
to borrowers desperate for quick loans.
3. See Jacobson, supra note 2; McClure & McClure supra note 2; Ohio
Voters Prove that a Good Idea Can Beat $22 Million, supra note 2; see also
Center for Policy Entrepreneurship, supra note 1 (stating that a Colorado
telephone survey finding “overwhelming support, regardless of political
affiliation, region, gender, income, education level, ethnicity and age. 83% of
Democrats, 72% of Unaffiliated and 68% of Republicans favored new caps on
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pricing are even more emphatic when considered in light of massive
industry advertising campaigns that nonetheless utterly failed to
persuade voters.4
This broad-based support for usury limits is built upon
American history, tradition, and culture. For nearly three-hundred
years, American states were nearly unanimous in their prohibition
of usurious lending through double- or even single-digit interest rate
caps.5 Every signatory to the Declaration of Independence returned
to colonies that aggressively capped interest rates.6 When the
“greatest generation” assumed the mantle of public leadership after
emerging from the Great Depression and the second World War, all
fifty states capped interest rates on small consumer loans with a
median limit of 36% per annum.7 For generations, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation used undercover investigations to track
down usurious lenders and incarcerate them.8 The American
public’s skepticism has at least in part grown out of a moral view,
grounded in the prevailing Christian faith of most Americans, that
the taking of excessive interest is a grave and punishable sin.9
payday loans”).
4. See, e.g., Steve Hoffman, Battle of the Ballot Issues, AKRON BEACON J.,
(Ohio) Apr. 28, 2011, at A6 (stating that voters upheld the Ohio interest rate cap
“seeing through an incredible barrage of misleading television ads”).
5. RANSOM H. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, PAWNS OR
PLEDGES, AND MARITIME LOANS 50 (1891) (discussing states in early United
States history with double- and single-digit interest rate caps).
6. Id.
7. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998); Christopher L.
Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1138
(2008).
8. See DENNIS FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 228–29 (2007).
9. About a dozen Biblical passages suggest that usurious lending,
especially to the poor, is a grave sin. For example, the first reference to usury in
the Bible states: “If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee,
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.”
Exodus 22:25 (King James). The Bible also intimates a harsh punishment for
usurers: “Hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shall he then
live? he shall not live: he hath done all these abominations; he shall surely die;
his blood shall be upon him.” Ezekiel 18:13 (King James); see also Ezekiel 22:16–
22 (King James); Jeremiah 15:10 (King James); John 2:14–15 (King James);
Leviticus 25:35–37 (King James); Luke 6:33–35 (King James); Matthew 5:42
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While not all subscribe to this moral value, it is clear that America
reached the zenith of its power, wealth, and international prestige
following centuries of aggressive enforcement of usury law and a
robust thrift ethic.
Nevertheless, in recent decades federal and state usury law has
become more lax and less transparent. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp.10
adopted a historically controversial interpretation of a Civil War-era
banking law that allowed national banks to export high interest rate
loans from deregulated states to consumers living in traditionally
regulated states.11 This ignited a race to the bottom in which state
legislatures were pressured to raise or eliminate usury limits in
order to avoid “discriminating” against local banks.12 Moreover, high
(King James); Nehemiah 5:1–13 (King James); Proverbs 28:6–9 (King James);
Psalm 15:1, 4–5 (King James); Luke 6:31–36 (King James); John 2:14–15 (King
James). The Biblical condemnation of usurious lenders is closely related to the
deep and consistent message of the Bible demanding kind and just treatment of
poor and vulnerable members of society. Deuteronomy demands “[t]hou shalt
not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy
brethren, or of thy strangers that are in thy land within thy gates.”
Deuteronomy 24:14 (King James). The Bible commands Christians to “[e]xecute
true judgment, and shew mercy and compassion every man to his brother; [a]nd
oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor the poor . . . .”
Zechariah 7:9–10 (King James); see also BENJAMIN N. NELSON, THE IDEA OF
USURY: FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVERSAL OTHERHOOD (1949) (providing
a summary and analysis of post-reformation Christian theology of usury);
Charles H. George, English Calvinist Opinion on Usury, 1600–1640, 18 J. HIST.
IDEAS 455, 455–74 (1957) (same); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson,
Usury Law and the Christian Right: Faith-Based Political Power and the
Geography of American Payday Loan Regulation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 637, 648–
55 (2008) (same). See generally ODD LANGHOLM, THE ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF
USURY (1985) (providing pre-reformation analysis of Christian usury theology);
JOHN T. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957) (same); Brian M.
McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of
Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (2008) (same).
10. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308
(1978) (considering “whether Omaha Bank and its Bank Americard program are
‘located’ in Nebraska and for that reason entitled to charge its Minnesota
customers the rate of interest authorized by Nebraska law”).
11. Id. (stating that “a national bank may charge interest ‘on any loan’ at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is ‘located’” (citation
omitted)); see also James J. White, The Usury Trompe l’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445,
451–53 (2000) (discussing the Marquette decision).
12. See Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!?
Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099,
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inflation in the late 1970s raised lenders’ cost of funds, making
profitable consumer lending temporarily more difficult within
traditional interest rate caps.13 This unusual macroeconomic
pressure led some states to relax or eliminate their usury limits.14
More recently, nationally organized, well-funded, and narrowly
focused state-by-state lobbying campaigns have persuaded many
state legislators serving on key financial services committees to
adopt special licensing statutes authorizing non-depositary finance
companies to make triple-digit interest rate payday and car-title
loans. As a result, usury limits no longer prohibit these loans for
banks in all fifty states and for non-depositary lenders in about
thirty-five states.
Still, while federal and state law has unraveled, many local
leaders around the country continue to ardently support the
traditionally restrictive American moral and legal view about
usurious lending to families. Responding to the vacuum in usury
law, over a hundred different local governments around the country
have adopted ordinances attempting to restrict payday and car-title
lending.15 Although this growing trend has generated relatively
little national press or scholarly commentary,16 it appears to reflect
1128–30 (2010) (stating that in the wake of Marquette, legislatures in a number
of states “either eliminated or drastically relaxed their usury laws and enacted
other provisions that favor credit-card users”).
13. See PAUL R. BEARES, CONSUMER LENDING 12 (2d ed. 1992) (“[T]he
Vietnam War was fueling inflationary pressures which made funds more
expensive and harder for banks to attract. Disintermediation—the flow of funds
out of depository institutions to sources paying higher rates—drained funds
available for lending and drove up the cost of funds.”).
14. See id. (“[P]rofit margins were severely squeezed as a result of a 1979
change in Federal Reserve policy that allowed interest rates to float freely at the
same time as the rates banks were allowed to pay for deposits were being
deregulated.”).
15. Unpublished database on file with author.
16. There are two notable exceptions. See generally Kelly Griffith, Linda
Hilton & Lynn Drysdale, Controlling the Growth of Payday Lending Through
Local Ordinances and Resolutions (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (“This
guide has been developed to assist community consumer advocates and
government officials take action to combat payday lenders in local communities
and at state legislatures.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Amy Lavine, Zoning Out Payday Loan Stores and Other Alternative Financial
Services Providers (July 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885197 (“This article will
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the great majority of the American public that supports the
illegality of triple-digit interest rate loans and the long historical
tradition of treating payday and car-title lending as a serious civil
offense, and in many states, a crime.
This Article explores the growing trend of municipal ordinances
and resolutions attempting to inhibit payday and car-title lending.
In particular, Part I introduces the historical background of
usurious lending regulation that provides the context within which
current local law must be understood. Part II describes and
analyzes the growing number of local ordinances controlling small,
high-cost loans and suggests that, owing to the limits on local power,
current local law has had very limited success in meeting its own
objectives. Instead, Part III proposes a model ordinance requiring
that lenders offering loans with annual percentage rates in excess of
45% display a cautionary message that reads “Warning: Predatory
Lender” on their street, storefront, and other on-premises signs.
Part IV argues that the well-established municipal authority over
signage provides a solid constitutional and statutory basis for such a
law. Part V concludes and is followed by an appendix with a model
ordinance suitable for adoption by most local governments.
II. The Law of Predatory Small Loans in Historical Context
All of the thirteen original American colonies aggressively
regulated consumer loans with annual interest rate caps of between
eight and five percent, with six percent being most typical.17
European colonists had imported these price limits from England,
which at the time capped interest rates with a simple nominal
annual rate of five percent.18 Both American and English usury law
grew out of both Protestant and Catholic theology on the moral
provide an overview of the various approaches that local governments have
taken to regulate alternative financial services providers.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See TYLER, supra note 5, at 50–53 (discussing the history of usury laws
in early American history); Peterson, supra note 7, at 1117–18 (explaining that
the thirteen original colonies “unanimously adopted usury laws capping interest
rates” and the most common rate was six percent).
18. See Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, 1713, 12 Ann., c. 16 (Eng.)
(stating that the interest rate shall not exceed five percent per year).
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limits of acceptable lending practices.19 Early American leaders held
usurious lenders in contempt.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, most states in the
Union began modifying their interest rate caps to allow more
expensive consumer loans. The change reflected the evolving
consumer culture of an industrializing America.20 As more
Americans earned their income through relatively stable salaries,
rather than seasonal agricultural income, managing a household’s
needs through the use of moderately priced consumer finance
became more culturally acceptable.21 Throughout most of the
twentieth century, “Small Loan Acts” were the primary consumer
financial protection law in the country. Most states based their laws
on a model statute sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation, a
charitable foundation created by the widow of a railroad baron.22
19. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 648−55 (discussing usury laws
and the Christian faith). Protestant reformers, such as Martin Luther, believed
that interest rates of 5–6% were moral, and that even 8% was permissible in
some cases. NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS 47–48, 77 (1989).
Moreover, after centuries of prohibiting any interest whatsoever, Pope Paul II
gave his tacit approval to charitable pawnshops to charge a 6% simple nominal
annual rate in 1461. Id. at 76.
20. See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 134–35, 143 (1999) (discussing the legalization of
small loan lending through the Uniform Small Loan Act and the propaganda
about “the productive nature of small loans”).
21. See id. at 143 (discussing the “success story” which was a tactic used by
lenders to promote “the productive nature of small loans”).
22. See ROGER S. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS AND
OF USURY, SALES FINANCE, AND ALLIED LAWS xiii (1952) (“Since 1916, the guide
for most consumer finance legislation has been the Draft of the Uniform Small
Loan Law recommended by the Russell Sage Foundation when the enactment
occurred.”). Many of the states that did not use the Russell Sage Foundation
model law relied on statutes that legalized “Morris Plan” lending, which
facilitated higher real prices by using an add-on interest rate, rather than
traditional simple actuarial interest rates. See EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE
CONSUMER 68–72 (1930) (discussing the use and development of The Morris
Plan); FRED H. CLARKSON ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT AND ITS USES 32 (Charles O.
Hardy ed., 1938) (“The [Morris] plan was that notes be discounted at the
maximum contract rate of interest permitted, and then repaid through the
purchase of investment certificates on a periodic installment basis.”); KATHLEEN
E. KEEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND
LEGAL CHALLENGES § 2.2.3.1, at 39 (1995) (discussing the plan developed by
Arthur Morris “which treated loans as repayable in a single lump sum at the
end of the agreed term and computed interest accordingly”). See generally PETER
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State Small Loan Acts licensed finance companies, authorizing
them to charge interest rates ranging from 24%–42% per year, with
36% being typical.23 Social reformers who lobbied for these rules
argued that ordinary citizens ought to have access to credit, and
that higher interest rate limits in this range were still within a price
zone where borrowers could benefit from the credit and have a
reasonable opportunity to repay.24 These low double-digit interest
rate usury limits allowed the development of credit cards and retail
installment loan purchasing that became a staple of middle-class
America.
By the 1960s, every state in the union had some form of a small
loan law on the books.25 A handful of states had exceptions or
ambiguity in their usury limits that allowed higher interest rates by
historical standards. But nonetheless, a typical contemporary
payday and car-title loan continued to be illegal in every state of the
Republic. Although today payday and car-title lenders chafe at the
term “predatory lender,” with relatively few exceptions, these loans
were illegal and often regarded as serious crimes for over threehundred years of American history.26 From America’s emergence as
W. HERZOG, THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING (1928) (discussing the
evolution of The Morris Plan).
23. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1120 (stating that states granted
“licensed lenders special exemptions to the older usury laws (which generally
remained on the books) authorizing interest rates between 2% and 4% per
month, or, between 24% and 42% per annum”).
24. See IRVING S. MICHELMAN, CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 112–29 (1970) (discussing “the remedial loan association
movement” and the fight against loan sharks).
25. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1138 (“In 1965, every state in the union had
a usury limit on consumer loans.”).
26. See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES
428–29 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the history of illegal loan interest rates);
Peterson, supra note 7, at 1119 (“This deep American skepticism of consumer
lending encouraged a legal commitment to limited interest rates that continued
largely unabated through the end of the nineteenth century.”). See also Beasley
v. Coleman, 180 So. 625, 629 (Fla. 1938) (quashing a habeas corpus petition that
challenged conviction for making an approximately 520% interest rate salary
loan in violation of Florida’s statute imposing up to six months incarceration for
usury); Jarvis v. State, 25 S.E.2d 100, 100−01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (upholding
criminal conviction for making an approximately 312% annual interest rate
salary loan in violation of Georgia’s small loan usury limit); Commonwealth v.
Morris, 56 N.E. 896, 897 (Mass. 1900) (holding that Massachusetts’s criminal
penalties of sixty days incarceration for violation of 12% simple nominal annual
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an industrial power at the turn of the twentieth century through the
apogee of our hegemonic leadership, the premier bastions of
consumer protection law were state Small Loan Acts championed by
the Russell Sage Foundation.
The United States Supreme Court was the first government
institution to meaningfully disrupt the centuries-old tradition of
American usury law. In the 1978 case of Marquette,27 the Court
confronted for the first time the question of what state usury law
applies when a national bank lends money to a consumer across
state lines: Should the law of the bank’s home state or the law of the
consumer’s home state apply?28 Turning to the National Bank Act, a
statute adopted in 1864,29 the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress had intended the law of the bank’s home state to apply.30
While seemingly innocuous, this holding gave a handful of rural
states the opportunity to deregulate every other state’s usury limits
usury limit was constitutional); Ex parte Berger, 90 S.W. 759, 760, 763 (Mo.
1905) (holding that Missouri criminal penalties of 30 to 90 days incarceration
for violation of 12% annual interest rate limit was constitutional); People v.
Lombardo, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 1074−75 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that New York’s
statute defining lending in excess of 25% annual interest as a class C felony was
not unconstitutionally vague). Some states temporarily experimented with
eliminating their usury laws for short periods in the nineteenth century. George
K. Holmes, Usury in Law, in Practice and in Psychology, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 431, 432
(1892) (“In eighteen states and territories that now have usury laws there have
been intervals since the first enactment on the subject during which such laws
were not in force.”). Moreover, in the “wild west” it would often take a few years
before newly formed states and territories would adopt usury limits. Id. at 436–
42 (discussing the history of usury laws “from the earliest times in January 1,
1892”).
27. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299 (1978).
28. See id. at 309–13 (considering which state usury law to apply when a
national bank lends money to consumers outside of the state in which it is
“located”).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006) (explaining that national banks can charge
interest rates according to the laws of the state in which they are located).
30. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 309–13 (“Since Omaha Bank and its Bank
Americard program are ‘located’ in Nebraska, the plain language of § 85
provides that the bank may charge ‘on any loan’ the rate ‘allowed’ by the State
of Nebraska.”); see also BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 725–34 (1957) (detailing the events that led
to the enactment of the National Bank Act); KEEST, supra note 22, § 3.4.5.1.1
(questioning the historical accuracy of Marquette).
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with respect to federally chartered banks.31 Recognizing the
opportunity to attract banking jobs to their states, South Dakota
and Delaware quickly repealed their interest rate caps and
encouraged national banks to open subsidiaries headquartered
there to “export” the nonexistence of an interest rate cap to
consumers in other states.32
For their part, banks chartered by state governments were
envious of their national bank competitors’ newfound power and
immediately began lobbying Congress for equal treatment.33 While
Congress did not explicitly authorize the “exporting” model of
deregulation, it did finesse the issue by granting state banks

31. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW 10-47 to 10-53 (2002)
(discussing the Marquette decision’s effect on usury law); William F. Baxter,
Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
1009, 1010–11 (1995) (explaining that after Marquette “no state could regulate
the rates or services produced by out-of-state national banks, even if the services
were purchased by its own citizens”); Robert C. Eager & C.F. Muckenfuss, III,
Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking
System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 66–67 (2004) (“These so-called ‘wild card’
statutes vary in their specifics, but generally provide for state banks to be able
to match national bank, and in some cases federal thrift, activities.”);
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2005) (explaining that the
Marquette decision “was a starting gun in a corporate race to the bottom that
significantly eroded the power of state governments to set meaningful interest
rate caps”); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding
Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 518, 619–20 (2004) (stating that after Marquette banks can “use the
Exportation Doctrine to disregard any interest rate location in any of those
other states”).
32. See White, supra note 11, at 447–48 (stating “that this statute would
allow a bank in New York to lend from its South Dakota subsidiary to a resident
in New York under South Dakota law”). “If the bank comes from a state like
Delaware whose laws permit consumer loans without rate or other restrictions,
the out-of-state bank can ignore not only the local rates, but also the local
market segmentation.” Id. at 464–65; see also Schiltz, supra note 31, at 618–20
(stating that “states such as South Dakota and Delaware [have the] incentive to
engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ of consumer credit regulatory schemes, in order
to attract consumer lending operations to their states”).
33. See Howard J. Finkelstein, Most Favored Lender Status for Insured
Banks, 42 BUS. L. 915, 918 (1987) (“The rationale for the requirement that
banks borrowing a rate must also comply with non-rate provisions is simply that
Congress is presumed to have intended that a bank borrowing a rate from state
law be put on an equal footing with its state-charted competitor.”).
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whatever power was already held by national banks.34 As a result,
state legislatures became powerless to constrain the interest rates
charged by any bank, whether federal or state chartered, that
happened to claim its headquarters in South Dakota or Delaware.35
Seeing no point in punishing their local financial institutions,
virtually every other state in the union decided to pass “parity laws”
that gave their own local depository institutions the right to charge
whatever interest rate South Dakota and Delaware banks could
import into their jurisdictions via federal law.36 The end result was
what James White called a trompe l’oeil—a grand illusion.37 Every
state in the union, save two, had relatively aggressive usury law on
the books, but these laws no longer applied to any bank in the
country.
That being said, at the beginning of the 1980s, state usury
limits still applied to non-bank lenders. Finance companies, car
dealerships, retailers, and even mafia loan sharks were still legally
required to comply with the traditional usury limits.38 Nondepositary finance companies resented the special treatment of
banks and in many states began agitating for their own special
exceptions to the old small loan laws.39 High inflation and prevailing
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(g), 1831a(b), 1831d(a) (2006); see also Interest
Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 63 Fed. Reg.
19258−59 (FDIC Apr. 17, 1998) (opinion) (interpreting Section 27 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act as providing the same interest-rate exporting powers to
state-chartered, federally insured banks as Section 85 of the National Bank Act
grants to national banks).
35. KEEST, supra note 22, at 74–75 (discussing the effect of “sister-state”
preemption).
36. See Christian Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National
Banks—The Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 368
(1995) (stating that “wild card statutes” can “enable State Banks to enter into
derivatives, insurance, and other banking powers currently enjoyed primarily by
National Banks’’); John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity
Laws: An Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and
Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 207 (2003) (discussing “parity
laws”).
37. See White, supra note 11, at 447–48 (“I argue that the stern statutory
restrictions on rates in Minnesota are an illusion whose only current function is
to give the appearance that the state is protecting consumers from high rates.”).
38. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1138–39 (discussing past usury laws and the
trend towards relaxing usury laws).
39. See id. at 1123 (stating that in the 1980s critics “continue[ed] battering
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interest rates in the late 1970s raised lenders’ cost of funds, and
made these lobbying efforts, at least temporarily, more persuasive.40
With prevailing prime interest rates in the double-digit range,
making profitable consumer loans was difficult under some of the
lower traditional interest rate caps. This unusual macroeconomic
pressure along with well-funded state-by-state lobbying campaigns
persuaded many state legislatures to adopt more expansive usury
limit exceptions.41
While payday lending had historical forebears both in the
United States and around the world, the industry reinvented itself
in this period by deferring the deposit of borrowers’ personal
checks.42 In a typical transaction, the borrower would write a
personal check to the payday lender but date the check for about
two weeks in the future.43 The lender would, in turn, “cash” the
check by giving the borrower the face amount of the check less a
finance charge. After two weeks went by, the borrower could buy
back the check by bringing cash into the payday lender’s store, or
simply allow the lender to deposit the check. In many states, payday
lenders insisted they did not make loans, but rather were simply
cashing checks.44 In other states, payday lenders teamed up with a
handful of banks to “rent” the banks’ Marquette powers.45 The
state usury laws” which remained applicable to “nondepository financial
institutions”).
40. See BEARES, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing inflation and the consumer
movement that was “highly successful in bringing about legislative changes”).
41. See id. at 12−13 (explaining that “[t]he consumer credit market faced a
major trauma in 1980,” and “[f]inancial institutions reacted by increasing
pressure on state legislators to provide relief from unrealistic usury rate caps”).
42. ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH 130–34 (2010) (discussing the practice of
post-dating checks, a “modern version of the payday loan,” which became
prevalent in the 1980s).
43. JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 30 (1994) (explaining that “check cashing outlets”
often made payday loans by “cash[ing] a customer’s personal check with the
understanding that it will not be cleared through the banking system until the
customer can deposit his next paycheck, perhaps a week or two hence”).
44. See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997)
(rejecting a payday lender’s argument that “it was not charging interest but only
service fees for cashing checks”).
45. See Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater
Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 146 (2005) (“Non-bank lenders
such as payday lenders can take advantage of federal preemption by partnering
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payday lender would do the marketing, intake, and collections, but
would pay a fee to a bank for permission to nominally make the loan
in the name of the bank.46 Eventually, the federal banking
regulators cracked down on these practices by issuing guidance
stating that deferred check cashing is a form of lending governed by
the Truth in Lending Act47 and that “charter renting” to avoid usury
limits is an unsafe and unsound banking practice.48 But in the
meantime, the payday lending industry had developed a critical
mass, with aggressive trade associations and highly effective
lobbyists. In many states, payday lenders supported weak
legislation that purported to “regulate” payday lending but actually
had little substantive content and primarily served to legitimize
hitherto illegal or even criminal loans. Indeed with average interest
rates of around 400%, payday loans were actually much more
expensive than the old mafia loan sharks that typically charged a
relatively mild 250%.49
with an out-of-state bank that makes the payday loan and then immediately
sells it to the payday lender that is located in the state with the restrictive
usury laws.”); Elizabeth Willoughby, Recent Development, Bankwest v. Baker:
Is it a Mayday for Payday Lenders in Rent-a-Charter Arrangements?, 9 N.C.
BANKING INST. 269, 273 (2005) (“Many out-of-state payday lenders currently use
in-state agents to carry out their business.”).
46. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia, 400 F.3d 868,
871 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining an agreement in which First American, a bank
located in Georgia, “managed and serviced” payday loans which were approved
and funded by First National Bank); People v. Cnty. Bank, 846 N.Y. S.2d 436,
437–38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (explaining agreements wherein County Bank,
located in Delaware, agreed to make payday loans which were “market[ed] and
service[d]” by Telecash, Inc. and CRA Services Corporation).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2011).
48. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Consent Order No.
2001-104 (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcementactions/ea2001-104.pdf; OCC Consent Order No. 2002-93 (October 28, 2002),
available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2002-93.pdf; Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter, Guidelines for Payday Lending
(Feb. 25, 2005) http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ben
Jackson, FDIC Actions Indicate Less Tolerant Stance on Payday, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 6, 2006, at 1.
49. Compare KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS, AND URIAH KING, QUANTIFYING THE
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING: A REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3 n.4 (2004), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/
system/files/imported/managed_documents/crlpaydaylendingstudy.pdf (last visited
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With the traditional moral and legal limits crumbling in many
states, the payday lending industry exploded. In comparison to the
hundreds of years of stable, thrift-oriented American consumer
finance, a massive usury industry sprang up almost overnight. In
the early 1990s, payday lending was a tiny peripheral component of
the financial services industry with only a few hundred locations
nationwide.50 But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of
locations around the country rapidly grew. For example, after
Mississippi legitimized payday lending by “regulating” it in 1998,
the number of payday lenders in the state quickly tripled.51 North
Carolina payday lending outlets roughly quadrupled in four years,
growing from 307 in 1997 to 1,204 in 2000.52 Wyoming payday
lenders almost tripled between 1996 and 1997.53 Payday lending
outlets quintupled in Salt Lake City between 1994 and 2000.54 In
Apr. 3, 2012) (“[P]lacing the general cost of payday loans between a $15 and $17
fee per $100 loaned for a period of approximately 14 days, amounts equivalent
to annual percentage rates of 391% and 443% respectively.” (citation omitted)),
with Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York’s Usury Statute, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 167, 167 (1966) (“Exorbitant interest rates, averaging 250 per cent
yearly and sometimes reaching as high as 2,000 per cent, are enforced primarily
by instilling fear of physical reprisal and, on occasion, by commission of acts of
violence.”).
50. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking:
Payday Lending (Jan. 29, 2003) http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/
012903fyi.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“Industry analysts estimate that the
number of payday loan offices nationwide increased from less than 500 in the
early 1990’s to approximately 12,000 in 2002, with continued growth expected.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See Jimmie E. Gates, Check-Cashing Businesses Rolling out the Dough,
CLARION LEDGER (Jackson) Feb. 6, 2005, at B1 (“The state has more than 1,000
check-cashing business[es] today, nearly triple the number in 1998, when the
Department of Banking and Consumer Finance began regulating the
companies.”).
52. OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
PAYDAY LENDING 5 (2001).
53. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN
SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 3 (1998), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/The_Growth_of_Legal_Loan_Sharking_1998.pdf.
54. See Christopher L. Peterson, Failed Markets, Failing Government, or Both?
Learning from the Unintended Consequences of Utah Consumer Credit Law on
Vulnerable Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 543, 560–61 (“With only fourteen lenders
listed in 1994, the industry appears to have since quintupled its outlets in the Salt
Lake area.”).
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Iowa, payday lender locations grew eightfold in only two years.55
Nationwide, the number of payday lender locations more than
doubled from 10,000 to 22,000 between 2000 and 2004 alone.56
Today, payday lenders and their secured creditor cousins, the cartitle lenders, are no longer fringe businesses. Rather they are a
powerful, multi-billion dollar industry that has completely
transformed lower- and middle-income American consumer finance.
Despite the usury industry’s formidable commitments to
campaign finance contributions and government relations, the
momentum in continuing legislative battles appears to have died
out. In recent years, several states have re-imposed more traditional
usury limits. North Carolina led this trend by allowing its payday
lending authorization statute to expire under a sunset provision in
2005.57 Georgia,58 New Hampshire,59 Oregon,60 and the District of
Columbia61 have taken similar measures. In Arkansas, the state
55. JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN
SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY (1998), available at
http://www.in.gov/dfi/2366.htm (“In two years, Iowa payday lenders increased from
eight to sixty-four. Louisiana licenses 345 lenders.”).
56. See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs
Justify the Price? 2 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/ wp2005/CFRWP_200509_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf (“The industry is growing very rapidly. Stephens Inc.
(2004) estimates that the number of stores rose from 10,000 in 2000 to 22,000 in
2004.”).
57. Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Justice, Payday Lending on the Way Out in
NC (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/News-and-Alerts/NewsReleases-and-Advisories/Press-Releases/Payday-lending-on-the-way-out-in-NC.aspx
(“The Attorney General’s Office and the State Commissioner of Banks have worked
together on the issue of lending since state legislators allowed North Carolina’s
payday lending law to expire after four years on August 31, 2001.”).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-14 (2011) (“A licensee may charge, contract for,
receive, and collect interest at a rate not to exceed 10 percent per annum of the face
amount of the contract, whether repayable in one single payment or repayable in
monthly or other periodic installments.”).
59. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 399-A:13 (2011) (“The annual percentage rate on
a payday loan shall be no more than 36 percent per year.”).
60. OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622 (repealed 2010) (stating that payday lenders
may not “[m]ake or renew a payday loan at a rate of interest that exceeds 36
percent per annum, excluding a one-time origination fee for a new loan”).
61. D.C. CODE § 28-3301–03 (2011) (“[T]he parties to an instrument in
writing for the payment of money at a future time may contract therein for the
payment of interest on the principal amount thereof at a rate not exceeding 24%
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supreme court used the state’s constitutional interest rate cap to
overturn legislation authorizing payday lending.62 In Ohio, Arizona,
and Montana the public has voted to reestablish traditional price
limits on state ballot measures.63 At the federal level, Congress
created the first national usury limit capping interest rates
chargeable to military service members at 36% per year.64 And, of
course, several states, particularly in the northeast, have
maintained a steady commitment to traditional usury limits.65 Still,
in many more states, usurious lenders have managed to forestall a
return to traditional American law with a variety of cosmetic rules
that do not provide meaningful consumer protection. It is these
states that have set the stage for a growing trend of municipal and
county leadership.

per annum.”).
62. McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 289 S.W.3d 18, 27
(Ark. 2008) (“Because the Act so clearly authorizes usurious interest rates, it
cannot stand.”); see also Adam L. Bodeker, McGhee v. Arkansas State Board of
Collection Agencies: Arkansas Shows Predatory Lenders the Door, 63 ARK. L.
REV. 645, 659 (2010) (“Because the Arkansas Check-cashers Act clearly
authorized loans charging usurious interest rates in violation of the usury
provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, the court held the Act unconstitutional
in its entirety.”).
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing ballot measures on
usury limits that have occurred in Ohio, Arizona, and Montana). Despite these
referendums, the payday lending industry is actively attempting to circumvent
public will in Ohio and Arizona by exploiting loopholes not closed in the precise
wording of the ballot measures. See Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in
the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 74–75 (2010) (“Many commentators
have noted how adept fringe creditors are at avoiding restrictive regulations.
The recent change in the payday lending law in Arizona provides an example.”).
64. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 987(b) (2006)) (“A creditor . . . may not impose an annual percentage rate of
interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit extended to
a covered member or a dependent of a covered member.”).
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-563 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12306(a)(2)(i) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 100 (2002); 209 MASS. CODE
REGS. 26.01 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19 (West 2012); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2012); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6213 (West
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(d) (2011).
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III. Predatory Is as Predatory Does: Inefficiency in Consumer
Finance Markets

The government relations and marketing wings of financial
services companies have long talked at cross purposes. When
consumer financial services companies speak to legislatures,
regulators, and courts, they tend to extol faith in the ability of
financial markets to resolve to efficient outcomes. The hallmark of
this consumer finance advocacy has always been Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand” guiding allocation of resources to a collectively
optimal outcome through individuals’ rational, self-interested
decisions. When the sales and marketing wings of financial services
firms communicate with prospective borrowers, however, the
unmotivated invisible hand is replaced by a calculated effort to
persuade and sometimes to confuse or mislead. Consumer finance
marketing focuses less on the relationship of supply to demand and
more on the formation and manipulation of instincts, wants, and
urges as reasons to borrow.66 While all financial industry lobbyists
are economists at heart, the best advertisers are psychologists.
Consistent with this observation, a growing body of
psychological evidence suggests that borrowers have behavioral
impulses that lead them into making decisions that are counter to
their own best interests.67 The characterization of financial-services
66. See Hooman Estelami, Cognitive Drivers of Suboptimal Financial
Decisions: Implications for Financial Literacy Campaigns, 13 J. FIN. SERVICES
MARKETING 273, 275 (2009) (“The explosive use of short-term lending such as
revolving credit products . . . which tap into consumers’ desire to gain immediate
access to funds, is partially a result of hyperbolic discounting. In recent years,
financial services marketers have recognized and effectively capitalized on this
phenomenon.”); Cornelia Pechmann et al., Navigating the Central Tensions in
Research on At-Risk Consumers: Challenges and Opportunities, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y
& MARKETING 23, 26 (2011) (“The concept of targeting—creating combinations of
product, pricing, distribution, and promotional elements to appeal to specific
market segments—is central to the practices for-profit and social marketers
employ.”).
67. See CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE
FOR THE HIGH COST CREDIT MARKET 156−99 (2004) (discussing behavioural
research and consumer finance markets); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373–76 (2004) (same); Estelami, supra note 66, at 274
(same); Karen E. Francis, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics
Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 627–31 (2010)
(same); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
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markets as driven by rationally comparing the value of one financial
service product to others is highly inaccurate. While some borrowers
make rational, self-interested, informed decisions on the value of
each loan in comparison to its opportunity cost, many do not. At
least seven common human psychological patterns create
opportunities for predatory lenders to induce contracts that may not
be in the best long-term interests of their borrowers.
First, consumers from all walks of life systematically
underestimate their exposure to human problems and overestimate
their ability to make risk judgments. Because people have difficulty
accepting their own vulnerability, most chronically underestimate
their chances of heart attacks, asthma, lung cancer, being fired from
a job, divorcing within five years after marriage, attempting suicide,
and contracting a venereal disease.68 Workers overestimate their
legal protections against employers’ arbitrary firings.69 Even
AKRON L. REV. 725, 725–39 (2005) (same); Debra Pogrund Star & Jessica M.
Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and
Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 85, 85–131 (2010) (same); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV.
707, 707–840 (2006) (same).
68. See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications
for Health, Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SC. PUB. INT. 69, 79–80
(2004) (discussing humans’ general over-optimism that negative events will not
happen to them). See generally SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 8–11
(1989) (discussing the concept of “[t]he self as hero” and explaining the evidence
that “adults’ positive self-perceptions are unrealistic”); Neil D. Weinstein &
Elizabeth Lachendro, Egocentrism as a Source of Unrealistic Optimism, 8
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 195, 195 (1982) (“People cannot accept their
own vulnerability. They expect others to be robbed, injured, or divorced, but
never think such misfortunes will happen to them.”); Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism about Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions
From a Community-Wide Sample, J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 481 (1987) (discussing
the results of a study on the “tendency to claim that one is less at risk than
one’s peers”); Neil D. Weinstein, Why It Won’t Happen To Me, 3 HEALTH PSYCH.
431, 431 (1984) (stating that there is “evidence of unrealistic optimism in risk
perceptions”).
69. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (“Almost everyone thinks that
his or her chances of having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease,
or getting fired from a job are significantly lower than the average person’s
chances of suffering these misfortunes; estimates range from twenty to eighty
percent below the average person’s probability.”); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining
with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perception of Legal Protection in
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sophisticated managers are prone to treat decisions as unique,
generating unreasonably optimistic forecasts by ignoring or
minimizing past results.70 Moreover, even when consumers actually
overestimate the probability of emergencies, they typically “think
that they personally are peculiarly less susceptible to such events.”71
Consumers tend to be unrealistically optimistic even when negative
events have happened to them in the past and when a real,
immediate, and visually vivid risk is present.72
This natural tendency leaves borrowers systematically
vulnerable to exploitative lending. The probability of many of the
events that people tend to underestimate, such as sickness, divorce,
and job loss, are precisely those events that are the leading causes of
insolvency.73 Moreover, there is robust evidence that borrowers
chronically underestimate the cost of credit, even in the face of price
disclosures.74 Credit card borrowers tend to make foolish choices
an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (“[W]orkers appear to
systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that they
have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact
have under an at-will contract.”).
70. See Marta P. Coelho, Unrealistic Optimism: Still a Neglected Trait, 25
J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 397, 402–04 (2010) (discussing the effects of unrealistic
optimism on “economic/managerial activities”); Daniel Kahneman & Dan
Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk
Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 17 (1993) (stating that those making decisions often
“consider problems as unique” which causes them to ignore past results and
make “overly optimistic forecasts”).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184 (1997).
72. See Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and
Generalization of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful
Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 39 (1992) (discussing “unrealistic optimism” regarding the
probability of being harmed by an earthquake); Peter Harris, Wendy Middleton
& Mark Surman, Give ’em Enough Rope: Perceptions of Health and Safety Risks
in Bungee Jumpers, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 68, 68 (1996) (discussing
“unrealistic optimism” about the dangers of bungee jumping).
73. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS (2001) (discussing the causes of middleclass bankruptcy).
74. See F. THOMAS JUSTER & ROBERT P. SHAY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND
ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 6–46 (1964) (discussing “consumer sensitivity to
finance rates”); see also NAT’L COMM. ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 18–21 (1972) (discussing data that shows “some individual
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about contractual terms because they are systematically,
unrealistically optimistic about their future card use and personal
circumstances.75 Federal Reserve Board researchers looking at data
for the past thirty years in all demographic groups find credit
cardholders’ opinions “about their own experiences are almost the
reverse of their views about consumers’ experiences in general,
suggesting considerable concern over the behavior of others and
possibly a belief that ‘I can handle credit cards, but other people
cannot.’”76 A study relying on point-of-sale interviews reports that
triple- and quadruple-digit interest-rate payday loan borrowers
were “hopelessly optimistic regarding when they expect to be able to
repay the loan, particularly at the beginning of the relationship.”77
Many lenders seek to exacerbate this tendency by “shrouding”
interest rates—leading borrowers to make life-altering decisions
with their biased intuitions, rather than careful financial
reflection.78
Second, many consumers tend to focus on the present benefits
of their actions, while underestimating or ignoring longer-term
drawbacks. People have an innate difficulty maintaining self-control
in the face of immediate gratification. They tend to prefer a benefit
that arrives sooner rather than later, in effect “discounting” the
consumers have problems repaying their debts”); Jean Kinsey & Ray McAlister,
Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-End Credit, 15 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS
249, 250 (1981) (explaining that “[s[tudies have shown that knowledge of the
APR is not readily translated into knowledge about the dollar cost of credit”);
Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation, and
Market Outcomes: Evidence from Truth-in-Lending Reform, 24 REV. OF FIN.
STUDIES 506, 513 (2011) (“We define payment/interest bias as a tendency to
underestimate an APR when attempting to calculate it based on other loan
terms.”).
75. See Sha Yang, Livia Markoczy & Min Qi, Unrealistic Optimism in
Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 170, 171 (2007) (“In this
paper, we study how such systematic judgment error, the unrealistic optimism
(also called wishful thinking) regarding the future usage, impacts consumer
decisions on consumer credit card adoption.”).
76. Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970–
2000, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 623, 628 (2000).
77. Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest Rates—Good While Supplies Last: A
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 605 (2010).
78. Stango & Zinman, supra note 74, at 518 (discussing the practice of
many lenders of “shrouding” interest rates).
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value of the later reward.79 While there are large variations in the
rates at which people discount the value of future benefits, decades
of empirical research confirm a strong present bias among many
consumers.80 This bias creates difficulty for consumers in
attempting to order their financial affairs.81 The abstract nature of
financial pricing makes self-control particularly difficult.82 For
example, saving when an asset is highly liquid is hard.83 Employees
are much more likely to accumulate retirement savings when
automatically enrolled in 401(k) savings plans—illustrating the
power of suggestion and inertia and the relatively minor role the
cognitive process of opportunity cost comparison plays in actual
financial decision-making.84 Rather than carefully weighing the
serious long-term consequences of their borrowing, many debtors
are irrationally “payment-myopic,” focusing on whether they can
make bi-weekly or monthly payments instead of whether the
contract as a whole is a wise decision. Because the negative aspects
of debt occur in the future, these outcomes appear less problematic
79. Richard. H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981).
80. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE
351, 358 (2002) (discussing the “discounted utility” model of decision making).
81. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit
Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 50 (1991) (“The failure of the competitive
model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices
without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest
on their outstanding balance.” (citation omitted)); Philip Bond, David K. Musto
& Bilge Yilmaz, Predatory Mortgage Lending, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 412, 413 (2009)
(explaining that “existing literature commonly attributes predatory lending to
lender fraud and borrower misunderstanding,” and one version of this view
“presents a model of payday lending in which a lender can, at cost, persuade
borrowers to overestimate their future incomes”).
82. Adam Gifford, Jr., Emotion & Self-Control, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORGANIZATION 113, 113–14 (2002) (discussing the human problem of selfcontrol).
83. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 443, 446 (1997) (proposing “that financial market innovation reduces
welfare by providing ‘too much’ liquidity”).
84. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149
(2001) (analyzing the change in employee savings after 401(k) enrollment
became automatic).
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than they actually will be.85 Payday and car-title loan borrowers
face difficult self-control challenges each time a balloon payment
comes due. Because renewing loans is so much easier than retiring
the entire debt, borrowers must overcome the temptation to renew
their loan each time in order to step off the debt treadmill.86
Third, consumer lending markets are likely to be distorted by
distressed abbreviated reasoning patterns. Psychologists report that
consumers who are suffering from emotional distress,
embarrassment, desperation, or fear frequently make poor decisions
regarding values and risk.87 People’s impulse control breaks down
when they face emotional distress.88 Most people have limited
attention capacity. When they use this attention to cope with a
stressor, many consumers use truncated reasoning to quickly escape
the stressful situation by seizing on the first minimally acceptable
option available to them.89 Because many consumers are in the
market to borrow money precisely to deal with some financial
threat, they are likely to lack the attention required to resist the
85. See Gretchen B. Chapman, Temporal Discounting and Utility for
Health and Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY &
COGNITION 771, 771 (1996) (explaining that in a study on “health and money
intertemporal choices,” researchers found “a delay effect (smaller discount rates
for long delays) and a magnitude effect (smaller discount rates for large
magnitude outcomes)”).
86. Francis, supra note 67, at 628 (discussing the rollover temptation
inherent in payday loans).
87. See Roy F. Baumeister, Esteem Threat, Self-Regulatory Breakdown,
and Emotional Distress as Factors in Self-Defeating Behavior, 1 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 145, 145 (1997) (studying self-defeating behavior); Karen Pezza Leith
& Roy F. Baumeister, Why Do Bad Moods Increase Self-Defeating Behavior?
Emotion, Risk Taking, and Self-Regulation, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1250, 1250 (1996) (“Our hypothesis is that negative affect causes people to make
choices in a way that leads to nonoptimal courses of action: Specifically, one that
may indeed hold out the chance of some highly positive outcome but also carries
substantial risks or costs.”).
88. See Diane M. Tice, Ellen Bratslavsky & Roy F. Baumeister, Emotional
Distress Regulation Takes Precedence Over Impulse Control: If You Feel Bad, Do
It!, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2001) (stating that emotional
distress is “detrimental to behavioral self-control”).
89. See Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of
Alternatives Under Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639 (1987) (discussing the effect of stress on decisionmaking); Willis, supra note 67, at 739 (discussing “truncated reasoning” and its
effect in stressful situations).
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temptation of a temporary financial “quick-fix.” Moreover, the most
vulnerable loan applicants tend to have problematic credit histories,
which lead them to evaluate loan pricing while fearing the
embarrassment and rejection. These conditions are likely to inhibit
loan applicants’ ability to adjust their perceptions of price as they
learn about loan terms.90
Fourth, even those borrowers who are not shopping for credit
under distress have great difficulty understanding and comparing
credit prices. Research shows that consumers tend to reduce the
amount of effort they expend on making sound decisions when those
decisions become more complex—a phenomenon known as
information overload.91 When faced with complex credit price
disclosures and boilerplate contracts, borrowers tend to focus on
only a few salient aspects of the decision, or even fail to try to
understand the information at all.92 Moreover, when borrowers lack
experience or understanding of financial and legal terms of loan
contracts, the opportunity cost of comparison shopping from
multiple creditors can be quite high, suggesting that careful
comparison may not even be rational for borrowers who have
literacy and numeracy challenges.93 The U.S. Department of
Education’s most recent national survey of adult literacy finds that
90. See Karim S. Kassam, Katrina Koslov & Wendy Berry Mendes,
Decisions Under Distress: Stress Profiles Influence Anchoring and Adjustment,
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1394, 1394 (2009) (studying how people make decisions under
stress).
91. See Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57, 57 (2005) (“Research in the decisionmaking literature suggests that consumers tend to reduce the amount of effort
they expend when decisions become more complex.” (citations omitted)); John
W. Payne & James R. Bettman, When Time Is Money: Decision Behavior Under
Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PRESSURE 131, 131 (1996) (“This paper investigates decision processes in
environments where there is time stress due to the opportunity cost of delaying
decisions.”).
92. Jeffrey Davis, Protection Consumers from Overdisclosure and
Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consume-Credit
Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 842 (1977) (explaining that despite extensive
creditor disclosure requirements, studies show that “much remains to be done”
to protect consumers).
93. PETERSON, supra note 67, at 131 (“The costs of acquiring information
must be evaluated relative to the resources of credit shoppers.”).
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22% of American adults lack even the most basic quantitative
literacy skills.94 These citizens have difficulty performing basic
quantitative tasks, such as using or understanding numbers
included in print materials. Thus, they are systematically
vulnerable to deceptive and misleading credit pricing tactics.95
Indeed, at least one analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis reports
a strong correlation between numerical ability and foreclosure.96
Fifth, the language, terminology, and marketing practices used
to present credit contracts can strongly influence how borrowers
perceive prices. Compelling evidence suggests that the way pricing
and risk information is presented, or “framed,” can consistently
influence human choices.97 For example, people are more averse to
medical treatments when identical risk data are framed as a
mortality rate than when framed as a survival rate.98 Consumers
treat identical investment risks differently depending on whether

94. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL
OF ADULT LITERACY (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/naal.
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95. See Gerard Caprio, Jr., The Great Innumeracy Epidemic, 11 FIN.
REGULATOR 37, 37 (2007) (discussing the effect of illiteracy on individuals’
financial decisions); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 260–62 (2002) (“[R]esearch suggests that
disclosure statements accompanying consumer contracts, however well
designed, may not be able to aid most consumers in understanding the terms of
their agreements.”).
96. Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette & Stephan Meier, Financial
Literacy and Subprime Mortgage Delinquency: Evidence from a Survey Matched
to Administrative Data (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 201010, 2010).
97. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (“Because of imperfections of
human perception and decision, however, changes of perspective often reverse
the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options.”).
98. See Barbara J. McNeil, Stephen G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Amos
Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1260 (1982) (“Recent work by cognitive psychologists on the
framing of decision problems indicates that the characterization of outcomes in
terms of the probability of survival rather than the probability of death can have
a substantial effect on people’s preferences.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251,
S254–55 (1986) (explaining a study where “[t]he same statistics were presented
to some respondents in terms of mortality rates and to others in terms of
survival rates” and respondents were asked which treatment they would prefer).

918

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012)

they are presented as a gamble or insurance.99 These patterns exist
and can be manipulated in consumer financial services markets. For
example, “[i]ndividuals will perceive a penalty for using credit cards
as a loss and a bonus for using cash as a gain; this will lead
individuals to use cash if and only if the ‘penalty’ tack is taken,
although the two situations are, from an economic and end-state
perspective, identical.”100 Payday lenders prefer to describe their
loan prices as a percentage of the loan principal, rather than with a
simple nominal annual interest rate because, for example,
borrowers are likely to perceive a two-week loan with a price of 15%
of the amount financed as less expensive than the same loan with a
391% simple nominal annual interest rate—even though these
prices are in fact identical.101
Moreover, people tend to rely too heavily on first impressions
when assessing risk and value.102 This is to say, people tend to
“anchor” on early estimates and fail to sufficiently revise their
perception of price or risk when further information comes to
light.103 For example, research suggests anchoring on the early
99. See John C. Hershey & Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking and
Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J.
RISK & INS. 111, 111 (1980) (examining “the extent to which . . . risk preferences
are influenced by problem context”).
100. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, in
BEHAV. LAW & ECON. 259, 262 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
101. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1154 (explaining that although “there is no
objective mathematical difference between a typical payday loan limited in price
with a 391% annual percentage rate cap and one limited with a cap of 15% of
the loan principal,” consumers often perceive the annual percentage cap as
higher).
102. See Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A
Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 37 (1999) (“Psychological
research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to
misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses.”).
103. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under
Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE 41, 46–51 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W.
Reder eds., 1987) (explaining the “anchoring-and-adjustment strategy in which
an initial probability is used as the anchor (or starting point) and adjustments
are made for ambiguity”); Robin M. Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional
and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 197,
206 (1981) (explaining that the “adjustment and anchoring heuristic” is
characterized by “[s]ubjects [who] are assumed to fix (i.e., anchor) on the
probability of one elementary event but fail to adjust sufficiently for the other
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estimate of the value of a lawsuit tends to disrupt later settlement
negotiation.104 Even accountants conducting audits anchor on early
estimates and insufficiently correct their judgments.105 Marketing
professionals have absorbed these lessons and systematically design
sales tactics to exploit this pattern in judgment making.106
Sixth, an impressive body of empirical research indicates most
people are irrationally averse to losses. The classical economic
account of rational decision-making suggests individuals should
value their out-of-pocket costs in the same manner as they value
forgone opportunities. This is to say, people should not be more
displeased with losses than they are pleased with equivalent gains.
But, some data indicate consumers are actually roughly twice as
displeased with losses as they are pleased with equivalent gains.107
A related tendency makes consumers willing to assume an
events” (citation omitted)); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128–30 (1974)
(discussing “adjustment and anchoring” which occurs when “people make
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final
answer”); Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of
Economics, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 152 (1991) (“[B]ecause of the
mind’s limited information processing and storage capabilities, humans must
use simple rules of thumb and heuristics to help make decisions and solve
problems.”).
104. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A
Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 54–56 (Kenneth
J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (explaining the role of initial reference points in
settlement negotiations).
105. See William R. Kinney Jr. & Wilfred C. Uecker, Mitigating the
Consequences of Anchoring in Auditor Judgments, 57 ACCT. REV. 55, 55 (1982)
(“The present study reports the results of an experiment involving two audit
tasks in which the judgments of audit seniors are biased consistent with their
use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.” (citation omitted)).
106. See Estelami, supra note 66, at 279 (discussing areas that financial
programs should address); Brian Wansink, Robert J. Kent & Stephen J. Hoch,
An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J.
MARKETING RES. 71, 72 (1998) (suggesting “that a simple anchoring and
adjustment judgment process adequately describes how consumers make
[purchasing] decisions” and “that marketers can influence quantity decisions
through anchors provided at the point of purchase”); Star & Choplin, supra note
67, at 97 (discussing “anchoring” as one type of “social psychological
phenomen[on] that prevent[s] [creditors’] disclosures from being effective”).
107. See PETERSON, supra note 67, at 175 (“Some data indicates consumers
are actually roughly twice as displeased with losses as they are pleased with
equivalent gains.”).
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objectively inordinate amount of risk when facing the loss of
something they already possess.108 For example, people who have
owned antique furniture or vintage wine for a long period of time
commonly refuse to sell their possessions for prices far greater than
market value—even though they could buy a replacement and
pocket the difference.109 Some economists explain this is because the
owners have “endowed” their possessions with personal value.110
Similarly, many firms sell products with “a thirty day trial offer”
with a “no questions money back guarantee,” where the consumer
does not have to pay until after the temporary period expires. The
seller realizes the buyer will pay a higher price after endowing the
product with personal value, or, stated differently, the buyer will
pay more to avoid losing a product they already have. By holding on
too tightly to the things they possess, many consumers exhibit a
classically irrational bias for preserving the status quo.111 In the
high-cost credit market, lenders have learned to exploit loss
aversion. For example, car-title lenders, also called “auto pawn”
companies, often extract more payment out of consumers who do not
want to lose their cars than the cars themselves are worth.112
Similarly, homeowners who have fallen behind on mortgage
108. See id. (“A related tendency makes consumers willing to assume an
objectively inordinate amount of risk when facing the loss of something they
already possess.”).
109. See id. at 175–76 (“For example, people who have owned antique
furniture or vintage wine for a significant period of time commonly refuse to sell
their possessions for prices far greater than market value— even though they
could buy a replacement and pocket the difference.”).
110. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1326 (1990) (discussing the “endowment effect” on individuals which occurs
when they own a good for a certain period of time); Cynthia E. Devers, Robert
M. Wiseman & R. Michael Holmes, The Effects of Endowment and Loss Aversion
in Managerial Stock Option Valuation, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 191, 194 (2007)
(discussing the “status quo bias” which is “a preference for the current state that
biases the economist against both buying and selling” a good that he has owned
for some time).
111. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1991).
112. See PETERSON, supra note 67, at 175 (“A related tendency makes
consumers willing to assume an objectively inordinate amount of risk when
facing the loss of something they already possess.”).
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payments will often agree to onerous terms refinancing their homes
in order to avoid foreclosure.
Finally, credit contracts generally, and high-interest consumer
financial products in particular, have the potential to exacerbate the
harm of addictive and compulsive consumer behavior. A reality in
modern life is that many Americans suffer from addictions and
compulsive behavior. The problems of alcoholism, pathological
gambling, and compulsive shopping all have the potential to be
negatively interrelated with consumer credit.113 Addicted and
compulsive consumers can use exhaustion of their financial
resources as a self-control mechanism—terminating a gambling
binge, for example, once the consumer has no more money left.114
Consumer credit, particularly when offered on predatory terms, can
create the constant possibility of relapse. Market forces do not
protect this large and vulnerable segment of the population from
onerous debt problems.
Collectively, these behavioral patterns suggest a very different
picture of the free market than the portrait painted by advocates of
weak law. Marketing academics have long recognized that
aggressive advertisers can leverage these heterogeneously
distributed behavioral patterns by targeting inefficient
consumers.115 Unlike the homogeneous pricing of most goods,
113. See, e.g., Ronald J. Faber & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Compulsive
Consumption and Credit Abuse, 11 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 97, 99 (1988) (explaining
that “compulsive consumption” is a “psychological factor” that likely contributes
to excessive debt); Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, 29 SOCIETY 43, 45
(1992) (discussing debt caused by gambling addictions); Howard Tokunaga, The
Use and Abuse of Consumer Credit: Application of Psychological Theory and
Research, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 285, 287 (1993) (explaining that “compulsive
buying,” which is defined as “a chronic inability to refrain from spending money”
often leads to “severe financial and psychological hardship” (citation omitted)).
114. Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling, Gambling on Credit:
Exploring the Link Between Compulsive Gambling and Access to Credit 19 (May
2006), available at http://gamblinghelp.org/media/.download_gallery/Gambling
%20on%20Credit.pdf (finding that “easy access to credit accelerates the problem
and process of a gambling addiction, increasing the likelihood that compulsive
gamblers will gamble more often, incurring higher levels of debt, and ultimately
inviting more severe personal and financial consequences when their resources
are exhausted.”).
115. Terri L. Rittenburg & Madhavan Parthasarathy, Ethical Implications
of Target Market Selection, 17 J. MACROMARKETING 49 (1997) (“One implication
may be another form of market segmentation, or an additional dimension for
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consumer loans are underwritten to the needs and abilities of
individual borrowers, giving lenders the opportunity to
heterogeneously price loans based on the inabilities and
misunderstanding of loan applicants. In many markets, shoppers
discern pricing and quality. But in consumer finance markets,
lenders can segment the market based on consumer vulnerability,
rather than on product quality.116
In addition to behavioral research, some scholars have
attempted to explore the welfare effects of small, high-cost consumer
loans.117 However, this research is notoriously difficult for a variety
of reasons. First, it is difficult for these studies to account for all
borrowers. Borrowers are often embarrassed and confused
regarding their financial circumstances and are reluctant or unable
to self-report their difficulties.118 Those who use small, high-cost
consumer loans may change jobs and relocate more often than more
affluent families, which introduces difficulties with tracking
borrowers long-term.119 Payday and car-title lenders typically do not
report their borrowers’ repayment patterns with the national credit
bureaus, and many borrowers in this market are not plugged into
identifying subsegments: taking product category and vulnerability of
consumers into consideration. This method may be useful in marketing, not only
socially desirable products, but also potentially harmful products.”).
116. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts,
92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 n.78 (2008) (“If market segmentation based on the
level or type of misperception is possible, then sellers will design their products
and pricing schemes in response to consumer misperception even when the
average bias is zero.”); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 22 (2011)
(“[L]endors could ‘prescreen for vulnerability,’ picking out people they could
most easily dupe.” (citations omitted)).
117. See infra notes 127–52 and accompanying text.
118. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 807. 897 (2003) (“Sharing word of mouth criticism of high-cost lenders
often means exposing embarrassing financial problems.” (citations omitted)).
119. Cf. Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, Long on Debt, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3–4 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Payday Loans, Inc.],
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/researchanalysis/payday-loan-inc.pdf (acknowledging the lack of long-term studies of
payday-loan borrowers and providing data from a two-year study of borrowers
in Oklahoma—one of only eleven states with a consolidated database tracking
system that allows this long-term research).
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the mainstream economy in the same way as more affluent
people.120
Second, it is challenging for studies to separate the welfare
effects of small, high-cost consumer loans with the effects of other
financial stressors and demographic forces in borrowers’ lives. Many
studies do not account for local, regional, and national changes in
labor markets; the effects of the housing bubble and crisis over the
past fifteen years; and the complex dynamics of other social forces
that affect low- and moderate-income communities, such as crime,
drug addiction, divorce rates, the number of dependents per wage
earner, educational levels, educational quality, military service, and
racial discrimination.121 Factors such as the fluctuating cost of
gasoline, the rising price of health care, and the declining access to
health insurance—all of which exist across complex temporal,
spatial, legal, and social patterns—profoundly affect many families.
Studies of payday and car-title lending must also contend with
causal noise created by other forms of credit, asset accumulation,
and asset protection, including credit cards, bounce-protection
plans, pawnshops, installment loans, negotiating delayed payments
with creditors, credit union programs, peer-to-peer online lending,
family support networks, saving accounts, and the ability of
borrowers to evade creditor collection remedies.
Third, many studies fail to account for the differences in
unsecured creditor remedies in various legal jurisdictions. The
growing use of payday loans offered—both legally and illegally—
over the Internet distorts the effect of laws regulating small-loan
markets.122 Even in states where the state government is
120. See Katy Jacob, Reaching Deeper: Using Alternative Data Sources to
Increase the Efficacy of Credit Scoring, THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION 6
(Mar. 2006), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/
managed_documents/alternative_credit_scoring.pdf
(“[T]raditional
credit
reporting agencies do not track or score payday loan payments, and payday
lenders tend to report only poor payment history . . . . As a result, payday loan
users have difficulty graduating to more mainstream and less expensive
credit.”).
121. See, e.g., Payday Loans, Inc., supra note 119, at 9 (finding, without
controlling for outside factors, that borrowers’ debts typically increase over
time).
122. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 855, 869 n.53 (2007) (finding only three of eight online payday lenders that
identify which state’s law applies); Jean Ann Fox & Anna Petrini, Internet
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attempting to collect useful data, many members of the small-loan
industry actively evade these reporting requirements as well as the
consumer protection laws that generally go along with them.123 The
civil justice system does not generally provide useful information
about this market because the size of the loans often makes
litigation cost-prohibitive from borrowers’ perspectives.124 Many
payday and car-title lenders have arbitration agreements that force
borrowers into private dispute resolution.125 And most of all, the
people who could supply the information to overcome these
hurdles—payday and car-title lenders themselves—generally refuse
to release their loan data.126
Nevertheless, in recent years researchers have released a
growing number of papers, some of which have been published, that
purport to show both beneficial and harmful effects of payday
lending.127 While a complete exposition of this growing body of
Payday Lending: How High-Priced Lenders Use the Internet to Mire Borrowers
in Debt and Evade State Consumer Protections, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. 4, 7–10
(Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Internet_
Payday_Lending113004.PDF (providing data about online lenders that evade
state laws).
123. See, e.g., Jean Ann Fox, Unsafe and Unsound: Payday Lenders Hide
Behind FDIC Bank Charters to Peddle Usury, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. 7–9, 13–
14, 17, 23 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/
www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/pdlrentabankreport.pdf (detailing various
ways in which payday lenders evade consumer protection laws and reporting
requirements).
124. See, e.g., Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s
Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic
Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1587 (2005) (“Consumer loans involve such
small amounts that bringing these cases on an individual basis is cost
prohibitive.”).
125. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2002) (providing data about payday lender
arbitration clauses).
126. See, e.g., id. at 40–47 (providing data on Ohio payday lenders who
refuse to disclose loan data).
127. See generally Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman,
Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14659, Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14659.pdf (analyzing “household
choices between liabilities [on balance sheets] and . . . the informational content
of prime and subprime credit scores in the consumer credit market”); Dennis
Campbell, Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of the
Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures,
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literature is beyond the scope of this Article, a few examples are
helpful. For instance, the payday lending industry has widely
distributed an unpublished working paper written by Donald
Morgan and Michael Strain.128 Morgan and Strain conclude that the
reimposition of traditional interest rate limits in North Carolina and
(Dec. 3, 2008) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335873 (analyzing the determinants of involuntary
checking and debit account closures); Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In
Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-18, Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1269414 (finding that “payday
loan access causes financial distress and severe misbehavior” for some Air Force
personnel); Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman,
Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members, (Pension
Research Council, Working Paper No. 2010-32, Nov. 11, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1707657 (examining patterns of
a credit union member’s financial choices, including a high level of payday
borrowing); Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28
(2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X
11000870 (discussing the effect of the availability of payday loans on the welfare of
communities after natural disasters); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do
Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 1113, Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/
J.Tobacman.pdf (estimating “the causal impact of access to payday loans on
bankruptcy filings”); Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday:
Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 309, 2008) [hereinafter Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday], available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr309.pdf (offering data to
contradict negative critiques of payday lending); Michael A. Stegman & Robert
Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17
ECON. DEV. Q. 8 (2003), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CC_Payday_
lending.2.2003.pdf (exploring the rapidly growing supply and demand for payday
credit and how it leads to chronic borrowers); Petru S. Stoianovici & Michael T.
Maloney, Restrictions on Credit: A Public Policy Analysis of Payday Lending (Oct.
28, 2008) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1291278 (finding “no empirical evidence that payday lending leads to
more bankruptcy filings”); Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access:
Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING
& FIN. 546 (2010), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jzinman/Papers/
Zinman_RestrictingAccess_jbf_forth.pdf (arguing that restricting access to
expensive credit harms consumers, on average, more than it helps them).
128. See, e.g., Donald Rieck, “Predatory Reporting” on Payday Lending,
ADVANCE AMERICA CASH ADVANCE (July 18, 2008), http://www.advance
america.net/about-us/media-details/152 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (referencing
the Morgan and Strain paper) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127 (offering data to
contradict negative critiques of payday lending).
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Georgia led to greater rates of bounced checks than the national
average, more complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
about lenders and debt collectors, and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing
at rates greater than the national average.129 Consumer advocates
at the Center for Responsible Lending, however, aggressively
challenged the study’s methods.130 With respect to the bouncedcheck claim, Morgan and Strain used regional data from the Federal
Reserve’s regional check-processing centers (CPCs) as proxies for
North Carolina’s and Georgia’s bounced-check rates.131 But each of
these regional CPCs also processes returned checks from other
states, including states with legal and rapidly growing paydaylending industries during the study period, and the data do not
purely represent North Carolina’s or Georgia’s returned-check
rates.132 Moreover, the study did not control for the other
independent, regionally related factors that could have accounted
for a very small reported increase in bounced checks across the
region including, for example, Hurricane Katrina.133 With respect to
FTC complaints, the Center for Responsible Lending pointed out
that the study did not account for the generally rising FTC
complaint rates prior to the study period nor the fact that complaint
rates are likely driven by the growing unrelated problem of identity
theft.134 Even more problematic was the study’s useless bankruptcy
data, which did not control for other independent variables that
“greatly influence a person’s chances of filing for bankruptcy
protection, including health insurance coverage, foreclosures,
129. For their conclusion, see Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note
127, at 26.
130. See CRL Critique of “Payday Holiday: How Households Fare After
Payday Credit Bans” by Donald P. Morgan and Michael R. Strain, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1–4 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter CRL Critique], available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/states/crlmorgan-critique-12-10.pdf (arguing that “Morgan and Strain’s data and
research methods are not adequate to support [their] findings or overall
conclusion”).
131. See Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127, at 3 (discussing
use of CPCs); CRL Critique, supra note 130, at 2 (describing CPCs as proxies).
132. CRL Critique, supra note 130, at 2.
133. See id. (stating the possible effects of factors such as Hurricane
Katrina).
134. Id. at 3.
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divorce rates, [and] demographic factors such as income.”135 Despite
all these shortcomings (as well as the authors’ disclaimer that their
findings were “preliminary” and shared “solely to stimulate
discussion”),136 the Morgan and Strain paper remains notable
because industry lobbyists have so frequently supplied the piece to
state legislatures and quoted it in the press that it remains the most
prominently discussed proxy welfare variable study to date.137
In contrast, Brian Melzer’s more recent study published in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics measures the effects of payday loan
availability on borrower well-being.138 Using a clever study design,
Melzer focused on families from states that effectively banned
payday lending, but the families nonetheless had access to payday
loans because they lived just over the border of a state that allowed
payday lending.139 This allowed Melzer to compare families that had
cross-border access to payday loans with similar families that did
not have access to payday loans.140 Melzer measured borrower wellbeing with self-reported variables, including postponed medical
care, postponed dental care, and postponed prescription drug
purchases; difficulty paying mortgage, rent, or utility bills; moving
out of one’s home due to financial difficulties; inability to afford
meals; and going without telephone service.141 Melzer conducted a
variety of different regressions to discover whether access to payday
loans caused an increase in hardship, including one focusing on
differences in payday loan access over time and another focusing on
different income groups—both of which confirmed his baseline
135. Id.
136. Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127, at cover page.
137. See, e.g., Rieck, supra note 128 (referencing the Morgan and Strain
paper); John Payne, Good Intentions Don’t Always Make Good Policy, THE
JOPLIN GLOBE (June 27, 2010), http://www.joplinglobe.com/editorial/x1617
565386/John-Payne-guest-columnist-Good-intentions-don-t-always-make-goodpolicy (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (referencing the Morgan and Strain paper) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 517 (2011), available at
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/126/1/517.full.pdf (estimating the “real
effects of credit access among low-income households”).
139. Id. at 518–19.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 525–26.
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results “that payday credit access is associated with greater
hardship among families with $15,000 to $50,000 of annual
income.”142 Melzer found evidence that families with access to
payday loans were more likely to have difficulty paying their bills, to
have to skip meals, and to live without access to a telephone.143 His
results suggest, for example, that the likelihood of reporting
difficulty paying bills increases by 25% for families with access to
payday loans.144 Melzer also found that families with access to
payday loans were more likely to suffer health-related hardship by
postponing medical care, dental care, and prescription drug
purchases.145
Similarly, Kurbin, Squires, and Graves recently published a
study in the Journal of Criminology and Public Policy showing that
a greater density of payday-lending locations causes an increase in
local crime rates.146 The study compared payday-lender locations to
reported violent- and property-crime rates in census tracts within
the Seattle area, regressing for a broad array of independent
variables that included the percentage of secondary sector low-wage
jobs, the jobless rate, the percentage of employed people working as
professionals or managers, the percentage of high school graduates,
the poverty rate, the percentage of black people, the percentage of
young males, the residential instability index, the percentage of
142. Id. at 534, 537–47. In addition to his regressions, Melzer also conducted
two falsification exercises to test whether his results held true in income groups
that do not commonly use payday loans. Melzer’s falsification tests showed that
geographic access to payday loans had no effect on individuals who do not use
payday loans because they either had such minimal income they cannot qualify
for payday loans or because their income was so high they have access to
cheaper forms of credit. Id. at 534–37. These tests further strengthen Melzer’s
case that his regressions capture a causal effect of payday-loan access.
143. See id. at 532–33 (indicating a strong increase in families’ likelihood to
have difficulty paying bills, and a mild increase in likelihood to cut meals or to
live without a telephone, when the families have access to payday loans).
144. Id. at 534.
145. Id. at 550.
146. Charis E. Kubrin, Gregory D. Squires, Steven M. Graves & Graham C.
Ousey, Does Fringe Banking Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates?
Investigating the Social Ecology of Payday Lending, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 437, 457 (2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1745-9133.2011.00719.x/pdf (studying the link between payday lending sites
and neighborhood crime rates).
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female-headed households, and population—all of which have been
shown to be related to community crime rates.147 This study
attempted to account for multicollinearity between the independent
variables, spatial autocorrelation, and endogeneity between crime
and payday lender density. In three different regression models, the
study found that “payday lending is significantly associated with
both violent and property crime rates. This relationship holds even
after controlling for a host of factors typically associated with
neighborhood crime rates.”148 The study asserts that payday lending
imposes “broader community costs . . . that all residents pay when
they reside in neighborhoods with a concentration of payday
lenders.”149 Taking one specific example of just such a community
cost, the study points out that much research has shown a strong
relationship between crime rates and property value,150 which
suggests that payday lending locations may depress property
values.151 This claim will not surprise the many local government
leaders around the country who have frequently asserted the same
point.152
While the social science is by no means unanimous, the best
evidence suggests that small, high-cost loans are harmful to
147. Id. at 444–46.
148. Id. at 456.
149. Id. at 457.
150. Id. at 458 (citing David R. Bowes & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Identifying the
Effects of Rail Transit Stations on Residential Property Values, 50 J. URBAN
ECON. 1 (2001); Steve Gibbons, The Costs of Urban Property Crime, 114 ECON. J.
F441 (2004); Richard H. Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime Control: Evidence
from the Property Market, 5 J. URBAN ECON. 137 (1978)).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Joel Davies, Editorial, Some Firms Hurt Neighborhoods,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 4, 2009, at 07B, available at http://docs.
newsbank.com/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/12DC0E8731B34440/D0C690B70D3F
4E599FDEF466B2BF232D?p_multi=OWHB&s_lang=en-US (“When zoning laws
enable predatory businesses to fill in the empty storefronts of our
neighborhoods, we see increased crime, decreased property values and
neighbors afraid to walk outside their doors after dark. Predatory businesses[,]
like payday loan operations[,] . . . prey on those whose ties to society already are
weakened.”); Annysa Johnson, Payday Loan Stores in Crosshairs: Tosa Imposes
One-Year Moratorium While It Studies Permanent Restrictions, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2006, at B6 (“Wauwatosa’s moratorium is in response to
neighbors’ complaints that the . . . [payday loan] store would attract crime and
lower property values.”).
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borrowers and their communities on balance.153 Given the
complexity of the research, local government leaders can be excused
for trusting their instincts, their values, and their own common
sense. We have a long legacy of many of our most respected leaders
and profound thinkers rejecting the notion that consumer lending
markets are naturally efficient. For example, while the Founding
Fathers were passionately committed to the value of freedom, they
had virtually no confidence in the inherent efficiency of financial
markets. President George Washington, the Father of Our Country,
explained:
[T]here is no practice more dangerous than borrowing
money . . . for when money can be had in this way, repayment is
seldom thought of in time . . . [.] Exertions to raise it by dint of
industry ceases. It comes easy and is spent freely and many
things indulged in that would never be thought of, if to be
purchased by the sweat of the brow. In the mean time, the debt is
accumulating like a snowball in rolling.154

Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of
Independence,155 famously feared banks more than he feared
standing armies.156 And Benjamin Franklin, an advocate of the Bill
of Rights, wrote:
153. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. app. 159 (2008)
(prepared statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia University)
(providing testimony of Professor Stiglitz, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist,
that “[e]xploitive practices of the financial sector need to be curbed”). Professor
Stiglitz further explained:
The financial sector realized that there was money at the bottom of
the pyramid, and they moved with all speed to ensure that it moved
to the top. The exploitive practices include pay-day loans, predatory
lending, and rent-a-furniture and similar scams. There needs to be a
usury law (and this also applies to credit cards) limiting the effective
rate of interest paid by users of the financial facility.
Id.
154. RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 108 (2010).
155. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EXHIBITION (July
22, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jeffdec.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2012) (“Jefferson retained his prominent role in writing [the Declaration of
Independence.]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
156. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in 11 THE
W ORKS OF THOMAS J EFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES , FEDERAL E DITION 533
(Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1905), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/
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[T]hink what you do when you run in debt; you give to another
power over your liberty. . . .
. . . When you have got your bargain, you may, perhaps, think
little of payment; but creditors . . . have better memories than
debtors . . . . The day comes round before you are aware, and the
demand is made before you are prepared to satisfy it, or if you
bear your debt in mind, the term which at first seemed so long
will, as it lessens, appear extremely short. Time will seem to have
added wings to his heels as well as shoulders. . . . The borrower is
a slave to the lender, and the debtor to the creditor, disdain the
chain, preserve your freedom; and maintain your independency:
be industrious and free; be frugal and free.157

The United States of America was founded on the shoulders of
leaders who refused to tolerate abusive loans.
Indeed, Adam Smith himself lacked confidence in the efficiency
of consumer finance markets. Instead of relying on his own insights
into naturally efficient markets, Smith emphasized the importance
of the overconfidence bias in financial decision-making, stating that
“[t]he over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of
their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers
and moralists of all ages. . . . The chance of gain is by every man
more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men
under-valued . . . .”158 Indeed, in his great treatise, The Wealth of
Nations, Adam Smith argued that behavioral patterns such as
overconfidence bias and hyperbolic discounting made usury limits
indispensible.159 In his words, high interest rate limits allow money
to be lent to “prodigals and projectors” that are “likely to waste and
destroy” capital overall.160 Instead, Smith argued that usury limits
should be set “somewhat above . . . the lowest market rate.”161 With

807/0054-11_Bk.pdf (“And I sincerely believe, with you, that banking
establishments are more dangerous than standing armies . . . .”).
157. Benjamin Franklin, The Way to Wealth, in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 213, 217–18 (Nina Baym et al. eds., Shorter 4th ed.
1995) (1733).
158. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 124 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776).
159. See id. at 388 (arguing for a rate limit to protect borrowers).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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respect to high-cost loans, the inventor of the invisible hand did not
believe in the invisible hand.162
IV. Zoning in the Void: The Local Response to Predatory Small
Loans
Like Adam Smith, many local government leaders believe
states should enact usury laws to limit prices in the market for
small consumer loans. To this effect, many local governments feel
compelled to fill the void in leadership in protecting citizens against
predatory lending in the absence of effective state and federal
action.163 Moreover, because public opinion favoring limits on smallloan pricing has proven more durable than the limits themselves,
local leaders face significant constituent pressure to respond to
payday and car-title lending.164 In the past few years, at least 135
local governments have attempted to restrict, regulate, or otherwise
arrest the development of usurious lending within their
boundaries.165 Local governments with starkly different political
and demographic profiles have reached similar conclusions
regarding the need to inhibit predatory small loans within their
neighborhoods.166 For example, San Francisco, one of the nation’s
most liberal cities, has adopted a fringe lending ordinance very
similar in approach to those found in small, conservative towns like
Little Elm, Texas and American Fork, Utah.167 Even still, this
162. See id. (arguing for a rate limit); see also supra note 158 and
accompanying text (explaining Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory).
163. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 2, 14 (concluding that
many states do not pass laws to protect consumers from usurious payday
lending, so “[l]ocal governments are left to address the problem of payday
lenders on their own”).
164. See id. (discussing local leaders’ reactions to public opinion against
predatory loans).
165. Id. at 15–20.
166. See id. (listing many different cities with similar limits).
167. Id. at 16, 18 (listing payday-lender ordinances of several localities,
including American Fork, Utah); Pallavi Gogoi, Costly Cash: In Texas, Towns Try
FIN.
(Mar.
10,
2010),
Zoning
Out
Payday
Lenders,
DAILY
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/10/costly-cash-in-texas-towns-try-zoningout-payday-lenders (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (identifying Texas municipalities,
including Little Elm, that have “wage[d] war against money stores”) (on file with the
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significant ground-swell of local support for restrictions on
predatory small loans likely understates the actual support for
regulation because the limits on local government power probably
deter some governments from acting.168
Local leaders hoping to inhibit predatory lending within their
communities must contend with federal and state preemption of
their ordinances. Federal preemption controls local ordinances just
as it does state legislatures.169 So, for instance, local governments
lack the power to cap interest rates charged by banks and credit
unions under the Supreme Court’s Marquette doctrine and its
related legislative buttressing.170 Moreover, statutes adopted by
state legislatures can, in some contexts, also preempt local
ordinances.171
Nevertheless, local governments do retain some powers
traditionally reserved for local governments.172 Some local leaders
have aggressively pushed the outer boundaries of these powers by
attempting to eliminate predatory small loans within their cities or
Washington and Lee Law Review); 7 on Your Side: New Rules for Payday Lenders,
(ABC7 KGO-TV San Francisco Television Broadcast Dec. 26, 2007),
available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/7_on_your_side&id=585
6908 (discussing the San Francisco ordinance that “no new payday lenders will be
allowed to set up shop within a quarter of a mile of an existing one”).
168. See, e.g., Rudolph Bush, Dallas Council Urged to Limit Payday Lending
Sites, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
community-news/dallas/headlines/20110103-dallas-council-urged-to-limit-paydaylending-sites.ece (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“Council member Tennell Atkins,
who[se] . . . district is home to dozens of payday-lending stores, said he’s ‘125
percent against them.’ But a resolution to the Legislature may be an empty
gesture. . . . The industry’s powerful lobbying arm has spread hundreds of
thousands of dollars to elected officials in Austin.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
170. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text (summarizing Marquette
and its aftermath).
171. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the law of state preemption of local
ordinances).
172. See, e.g., infra note 250 and accompanying text (stating that courts
typically allow local governments to regulate consumer finance).
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counties. For example, Jacksonville, Florida adopted an ordinance
attempting to cap payday loan prices.173 Florida state law generally
imposes a usury limit of 18%.174 Lenders exceeding this price cap
without a license are subject to criminal prosecution.175 But, the
Florida legislature has also granted licenses to payday lenders
allowing them to charge fees amounting to an interest rate of
approximately 300% on a typical payday loan.176 Many Florida
payday lenders ignore this high limit by purporting to partner with
a broker, called a credit service organization, that charges a fee for
arranging the payday loan.177 In effect, many payday lenders
entirely ignore Florida’s triple-digit interest rate price cap through
this loophole.
Resentful of the consequences of these loans for its citizens,
particularly the many military service members stationed at a local
navy base, Jacksonville attempted to push for a more consumerfriendly usury law by adopting its own 36% interest rate limit.178
The city took the position that the state’s price cap on payday
lending constituted a consumer protection floor that the city could
raise if it chose to do so.179 Nothing in the state’s payday lending
statute explicitly contradicted this interpretation.180 Nevertheless,
173. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 30–36 (providing the
Jacksonville ordinance regulating payday-lending practices).
174. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02(1), 687.03(1) (2011).
175. Id. Unlicensed lending—even in large amounts—at annual interest
rates above 25% is a crime in the state of Florida. Id. § 687.071.
176. See id. § 560.404(6) (allowing payday lenders to charge up to 10% of the
loan plus a verification fee); Peterson, supra note 7, at 1123–24 (explaining how
a fee of $52 can amount to a triple-digit interest rate on the payday loan).
177. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1152–53 (explaining how payday lenders
partner with credit service organizations “to make payday loans outside the
scope of state price limits” (citations omitted)).
178. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 26, 30–36 (providing
the 2005 Jacksonville ordinance, which “reduc[ed] the interest rate to 36%”
because “payday lending practices in general have proven to be detrimental to
numerous individuals[,] including military service members”).
179. See id. at 31–32 (“This [statute] is supplemental to all other laws or
ordinances, and in no way impairs or restricts the authority granted to the
Florida Department of Financial Services, or any other regulatory authority
with concurrent jurisdiction over the matters stated in this chapter.”).
180. See Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Fla., Inc. v. Consol. City of
Jacksonville, Fla., No. 16-2005-CA-7025-MA, slip op. at 2–3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June
1, 2006) (stating that the state payday lending statute does not explicitly define
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when a payday lender challenged the city’s ordinance, a state trial
judge struck down the price cap, finding that the state legislature
had intended to preempt local price regulation.181
Less direct than Jacksonville’s ordinance, a St. Ann, Missouri
ordinance attempted to prevent triple-digit payday lending within
its city by framing its prohibition as an exercise of municipalities’
traditional right to use zoning law for land-use planning.182 The
Missouri legislature adopted a statute that authorizes licensed
payday lenders to collect interest and fees up to 75% of the initial
principle of any single loan.183 While there is some ambiguity in the
statute, the law’s most simple interpretation appears to authorize
accrued interest of 75% of the loan principle, which, for a typical
two-week payday loan of $325, constitutes an astounding annual
interest rate of 1955.36%.184 Concerned about the stability and
propriety of this type of lending, St. Ann acted to protect its citizens
with an ordinance that read:
A business engaged in providing short-term loans to members of
the public as a primary or substantial element of its operations
and which is not licensed by the appropriate state or federal
agency as a bank or savings and loan association[] . . . is
prohibited in all zoning districts of the City of St. Ann. 185

While the ordinance did not presume to cap interest rates—
something that would have clearly contradicted Missouri’s
the elements of the payday-lending relationship).
181. See id. at 2.
182. See State ex rel. Sunshine Enters. of Mo. v. Bd. of Adjustment of St.
Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 311–13 (Mo. 2002) (stating that St. Ann viewed its
ordinance prohibiting payday lenders as “a land use ‘zoning’ regulation,” which
would be “presumptively within the police power” (citations omitted)); see also
Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 27 (describing the St. Ann
ordinance).
183. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 408.100, 408.505.3 (2011).
184. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1139 (“A $325 loan that grows 75% in 14
days carries an annual percentage rate of 1955.36%.”); APR Calculation
Formula, MO. DIVISION OF FIN., http://finance.mo.gov/consumercredit/apr.php
(last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (showing how a 75% interest rate can yield an
enormous annual interest rate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
185. Sunshine Enters., 64 S.W.3d at 312 (providing the St. Ann, Missouri
ordinance that the court overrules) (citation omitted).
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extremely high price limit on payday loans—it did refuse to grant a
local business license to any non-depository short-term lender.186 A
payday lender brought suit challenging the ordinance, and the case
eventually made its way to the Missouri Supreme Court.187 The
court held that, although the ordinance purported to be a zoning
measure, state law nonetheless preempted it because St. Ann had
prohibited an activity that state law permits.188
So limited, some local governments have attempted to use the
persuasive power of their moral authority, rather than the operation
of law, to prevent predatory small loans. For example, some cities
and counties have adopted non-binding resolutions demanding that
their state legislatures re-establish traditional usury limits.189 Local
governments in Virginia, where legislative battles on payday and
car-title lending have become a seasonal fixture, have pursued this
strategy in particular.190 Over thirty different local governments
have adopted non-binding resolutions demanding that Virginia reestablish a traditional usury limit of 36%.191 But, as this Article goes
to press, a majority of the Virginia Assembly remains unpersuaded.
While Jacksonville and St. Ann serve as examples of ordinances
that did not survive judicial challenges, there are many more local
governments that have taken measures that remain in force. In
recent years, local governments have turned to their well-accepted
power to adopt zoning ordinances to stem the tide of payday and
car-title lending within their jurisdictions. These zoning ordinances
186. Id.
187. Id. at 310.
188. See id. at 314 (“Where the city prohibits a business that state law
permits, the city has the burden to show that the ordinance does not conflict
with state law. . . . In this case, the city has not shown that Ordinance 2074 is a
valid exercise of the zoning power.”).
189. See, e.g., Resolution No. 3202, § 1, Sachse, Texas (April 5, 2010) (urging
the state legislature and Governor of Texas to enact laws to “[c]lose the loophole
in state law that allows payday, auto title, and other consumer loans to carry
annual percentage rates upwards of 500%.”).
190. See Anita Kumar, Pressure Mounts on Va. Payday Lenders: Coalition
Plans to Push Legislature for Limits, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at B01 (“More
than [thirty] Virginia cities and counties have approved resolutions seeking
stricter regulations.”).
191. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 20 (“During 2007 and
2008 at least 37 cities in Virginia passed a resolution asking the state assembly
to cap payday loan interest rates.”).

“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER”

937

tend to take one or more of three basic forms: (1) restrictions on the
location where predatory lenders can operate; (2) discretional
permits that restrict who may obtain licenses to engage in predatory
lending; and (3) permanent or temporary limits on the number of
predatory lending locations within a jurisdiction.
First, perhaps the most common local restriction on predatory
lending outlets is a limit on where lenders can locate. Some
jurisdictions restrict the proximity of predatory lenders to
residences, churches, schools, or other protected buildings. For
example, Oakland, California prohibits the location of check
cashiers within 500 feet of any school.192 Some local governments
also restrict predatory lenders from clustering together by requiring
a minimum distance separating locations.193 There is considerable
variety in the required minimum distance, with some leaders
adopting a cosmetic 600 feet and others requiring as much as a mile
of separation.194 Other local leaders have protected specially zoned
commercial districts or streets where predatory lenders are not
allowed. For example, Sachse, Texas prohibits payday lenders,
check cashers, and car-title lenders from locating within 500 feet of
the President George Bush Tollway.195
Second, many local governments have adopted ordinances that
require a special permit prior to opening a predatory lending
location.196 These conditional permits typically require an
application and a public hearing in front of some type of land-use
planning board.197 These hearings give local governments an
192. OAKLAND, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 17.102.430(A)(2) (2004) (restricting
check-cashing activities from operating near certain protected facilities).
193. See, e.g., CASA GRANDE, ARIZ., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.12.415(A)
(2009) (requiring a minimum distance of 1,320 feet separating deferred
presentment companies).
194. Compare WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH, CODE § 7-1-103(30) (2011) (“No
check cashing or deferred deposit loan business shall be located within 600 feet
of any other check cashing business.”), with SANDY CITY, UTAH, LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE, § 15A-11-20(A)(1) (2008) (stating that non-depositary
financial institutions “[s]hall not be located within 5,280 feet (one mile) of the
same type of use inside or outside the Sandy City geographical boundaries”).
195. SACHSE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 3, § 11.2(c)(1) (2009).
196. See, e.g., ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. X,
§ 1003.133(3)(21) (2009) (requiring small-loan businesses to obtain a permit
before locating in certain areas).
197. See, e.g., id. § 1003.181(8) (describing procedures for obtaining the

938

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012)

opportunity to look into the background of the permit applicant and
consider the merits of the proposed location. While there is variation
in local practices, the ordinances that create these conditional
permit requirements tend not to impose overly restrictive standards
on who can receive a permit. In practice, these permit requirements
create a small barrier to entry but typically do not empower
planning boards to effectively eliminate predatory small-loan outlets
in their communities.198
Third, some jurisdictions have explicitly limited the number of
predatory small-loan locations that may exist within their
communities. For example, the leaders of St. Ann, Missouri, who
unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit all payday lenders in their
town, have since limited payday lenders to no more than three
locations.199 Some cities and counties have adopted limits relative to
the population. For example, West Valley City, Utah has an
ordinance limiting payday lenders to no more than one store per ten
thousand residents.200 Still, other governments have adopted
temporary moratoriums prohibiting new locations while the
government leaders study and debate how to respond to predatory
lending.201
Unfortunately, each of these zoning strategies suffers from
systemic weakness. Almost without exception, zoning restrictions
conditional-use permit, including an application and a hearing).
198. If the permits are overly restrictive in a state that permits such
establishments, courts would likely strike down the ordinance as prohibitive
and contrary to state law. See State ex rel. Sunshine Enters. of Mo. v. Bd. of
Adjustment of St. Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. 2002) (holding invalid a city
ordinance that effectively prohibited businesses otherwise permitted under
Missouri law).
199. See ST. ANN, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. IV, ch. 400, § 390(23) (2011)
(limiting the number of short-term loan establishments in the C-2 district to
three). The C-2 district is the only district in St. Ann that allows short-term loan
establishments; all other districts that allow businesses specifically exclude
these establishments or include only other, enumerated businesses. Id. §§ 20,
290(H), 460(12), 550–70.
200. See WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH, CODE § 7-1-103(30) (2011) (allowing one
deferred-deposit loan business per ten thousand citizens living in West Valley
City).
201. See, e.g., Ruth Ingram, Business Ban Still in Effect in Clinton, CLARIONLEDGER, Mar. 15, 2010, at A9 (discussing Clinton, Mississippi’s moratorium on
new payday loan stores).
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have provided too little protection too late. Local governments
established limits on the number of locations after the predatory
lenders already saturated the city, town, or county with outlets.202
Indeed, this saturation has typically served as the political impetus
for the ordinance in the first place.203 Most local governments have
felt compelled to grandfather-in existing locations, which effectively
cements the unsatisfactory development pattern in place for the
long term.204 Moreover, minimum-distance restrictions on predatory
lender locations may look good on paper but actually provide
minimal inhibition of the lenders’ business models. Payday lenders
themselves report in their SEC disclosures that they generally
attempt to locate within three miles of their target demographic.205
Virtually all the distance limits adopted throughout the United
States are too small to impede the basic business model of predatory
small-loan businesses. Zoning barriers to entry may, in effect,
actually serve only to inhibit whatever minimal competition exists
within the predatory lending market. Although excluding payday or
car-title lenders from some favored districts may be cosmetically
appealing, it does little to protect vulnerable citizens from financial
predators. Ironically, many of the zoning restrictions only serve to
“force” predatory lenders to locate in the poor, often minority

202. See, e.g., id. (providing an example of how fifteen “shops classified as
either pawn, loan or title loan, payday loan, check-cashing, or check or cash
advance” remained unaffected by the city’s moratorium).
203. See, e.g., Tim Jones, States to Payday Lenders: Denied: Governments
Curb Loan Operators That Have Grown So Much They Outnumber McDonald’s
Outlets, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 23, 2008, at 3 (discussing how the “explosive”
growth of payday lenders has led some state legislatures to debate rate caps and
other reforms).
204. See, e.g., NORWALK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17.04, art. II, § 95(D)
(2012) (“Any payday loan establishment lawfully existing prior to the effective
date of the ordinance codified in this section and which is licensed by the City of
Norwalk[] shall be allowed to remain on the same property . . . .”).
205. See, e.g., Check Into Cash, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement Under
the Securities Act of 1933, SEC ARCHIVES, 33 (July 31, 1998),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067289/0000931763-98-001978.txt (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Check Into Cash] (stating that Check Into
Cash “seeks to open each new store within three miles of the market area that it
is intended to serve”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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neighborhoods and strip malls that they wanted to operate in
anyway.206
But perhaps the most unsatisfactory result of local ordinances
is their propensity to demobilize efforts for more meaningful change.
Zoning ordinances have been relatively easy to pass precisely
because predatory lenders do not view these rules as a threat to
their activities.207 In reality, while zoning ordinances do very little to
protect vulnerable families from abusive financial products, they do
provide political cover for leaders who do not want to risk offending
the powerful predatory finance lobby.208 Well-intentioned local
governments can declare a “victory,” congratulate themselves with
an article in the local newspaper, and leave the basic underlying
problem unsolved. There is little indication that these zoning
ordinances have been part of effective campaigns building toward
more lasting and meaningful legal changes.209
V. Plainspoken Leadership: A Proposal for Cautionary Signage
Ordinances
This Part proposes a local ordinance strategy through which
local leaders could both provide meaningful consumer protection
and send a strong message mobilizing their community toward
traditional limits on predatory loans. Appendix A, which follows this
Article, includes a “Model Small Predatory Lending Ordinance.”
This ordinance proposes that local governments require a
206. See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 30, 31, 35
(Fannie Mae Found. 2001) (presenting data that the subprime lending market
concentrates in low-income, minority neighborhoods and that lenders target
limited-income households).
207. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 7, at 1157 (“The counterintuitive irony is
that high cost lenders actually advocated for the very exceptions and loopholes
that have raised the compliance costs associated with nonuniform state
policymaking.” (citation omitted)).
208. See, e.g., id. at 1111 & n.2 (stating that the payday-lending industry
spends millions on lobbying and public relations).
209. It is worth noting that the proposed model ordinance included in
Appendix A is not mutually exclusive with other existing local ordinances. Local
governments that have already adopted zoning restrictions should also consider
adapting the proposed model ordinance to fit within their existing laws.
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cautionary message on signs at businesses offering credit at annual
percentage rates exceeding 45%.210 The signage requirements of the
proposed small predatory lending ordinance are divided into two
different types.
First, the ordinance requires that all of the exterior signs at a
predatory lending business carry a local government cautionary
message.211 For example, an ordinance adopted by the city of
“Anywhere” would read: “City of Anywhere Warning: Predatory
Lender.” The ordinance requires that the display of this cautionary
message covers one-third of the spatial area on each exterior sign212
and that the text of the cautionary message be black on a white
background.213 While the proposed ordinance requires that
predatory lenders display the warning on any of their exterior signs,
the warning is not required if the lender forgoes exterior signage.214
Thus, the warning requirement is “tailored to match the degree to
which a predatory lender advertises at its location. The amount of
required warning signage matches the amount of predatory lending
advertisement chosen by the predatory lender.”215
Second, the ordinance requires the display of official door signs
created and distributed by the director of a city or county
department who is charged with enforcing the ordinance.216 The
ordinance requires display of these door signs on all exterior doors of
a predatory lending facility.217 These official door signs include the
cautionary message in the same color and font pattern as the
warnings displayed on the lender’s existing exterior signs.218 But,
the cautionary door sign also includes an additional explanation
indicating: that the city or county in question has determined that
the facility displaying the sign engages in predatory lending; that
the local government requires predatory lending warnings on
210. Infra Appendix A § 600.
211. Infra Appendix A § 600(b).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 600 official cmt. 2.
215. Id.
216. Infra Appendix A § 600(c), (d).
217. Infra Appendix A § 600(c).
218. See infra Appendix A § 600(e) (“[P]redatory lending door signs shall
have black, Arial, all-capitals text with a white background.”).
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displayed signs under a consumer protection law; that the lender
offers loans at interest rates above 45%; and, that “[t]hese loans can
cause bounced checks, penalty fees, repossessions, lawsuits, and
severe financial hardship.”219
In addition to signage requirements, the proposed ordinance
includes a few other features designed to defend and enforce the
ordinance. With respect to the former, predatory lenders are likely
to challenge this ordinance in court. To this end, the proposed
ordinance includes legislative findings based upon empirical
research regarding the consequences of predatory lending.220 The
model ordinance also includes official comments that explain the
various provisions of the statute, including graphic illustrations of
the ordinances’ signage requirements.221 With respect to
enforcement, the model ordinance requires all businesses lending at
annual percentage rates (APR) in excess of 45% to obtain a
permit.222 The permit requirement includes a licensing fee to cover
the cost of enforcement of the ordinance and to generate revenue for
the city or county.223 The proposed ordinance allows either the local
government agency charged with enforcing the act or former
borrowers to bring lawsuits to enforce the ordinance.224 Similar to
federal consumer-protection laws, the ordinance instructs courts to
award modest statutory damages, court costs, and reasonable
attorney fees to the local government or private plaintiffs that
succeed in an enforcement lawsuit.225
There is no question that predatory lenders will be incensed by
the proposed predatory small loan ordinance suggested in this
Article. But their visceral reaction is born from the painful reality of
their commercial behavior. The truth of what these businesses have
become is hurtful. Despite their public relations and government
219. Id.
220. See infra Appendix A § 200 (providing findings about the predatory
practices of high-cost loans).
221. See, e.g., infra Appendix A § 600 official cmt. 3 (providing illustrations
of signs).
222. Infra Appendix A §§ 500(a), 300(e).
223. See infra Appendix A § 500(b) (imposing an annual fee of approximately
$10,000).
224. Infra Appendix A § 700(b), (c).
225. Id.
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lobbying efforts to the contrary, lenders that charge exorbitant
interest rates to American families are false friends of the working
poor and middle classes. While these lucrative companies have, in
many instances, invested their profits in forging their polished
corporate brands, local government leaders are under no obligation
to play along with efforts to camouflage abusive loans. Indeed, as
President Reagan once explained, “To grasp and hold a vision, to fix
it in your senses—that is the very essence, I believe, of successful
leadership . . . .”226 The proposed ordinance in Appendix A is useful
because it provides a reoccurring, simple, and boldly featured
message of warning to potential victims of abusive commercial
behavior. Instead of confusing, numeric information that many
Americans cannot understand,227 the proposed ordinance clearly
signals the danger associated with predatory loans. High-cost
lenders will object to this warning not because it is inaccurate but
because they realize its power and effectiveness.
A. Why Forty-Five Percent? Choosing a Clear, Justified, and
Enforceable Bright Line
The proposed model ordinance includes a clear and enforceable
bright-line price threshold of 45% APR for identifying predatory
small loans. This is an appropriate threshold for at least two
reasons. First, the characterization of loans at prices above 45%
APR as “predatory” reflects the policy objectives of federal law.
Under current federal criminal law, an annual actuarial interest
rate in excess of 45% is considered one factor in establishing prima
facie evidence that a loan is extortionate.228 Extortionate
lending is a serious crime, punishable by up to twenty years in

226. Ronald Reagan, President, Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by Artists
and Cultural Leaders in Moscow (May 31, 1988), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/053188a.htm.
227. See Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and
Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit
Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 876–79, 920 (1977) (providing data that only a
small percentage of study participants could understand how to calculate the
full cost of credit).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006).
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federal prison.229 While there are, of course, additional elements
factored into the criminal prosecution of extortionate lending, the
prima facie evidentiary threshold of 45% reflects the congressional
judgment that prices above this interest rate are indicative of
criminal, and by implication predatory, behavior.230 In common
usage, the term “predatory” merely indicates that a behavior is
inclined to injure or exploit for personal gain or profit.231 For over
forty years, federal law has held that loan prices in excess of 45%
are indicative of illicit and exploitative intentions.232 Because
Congress has used this threshold as a legal device suitable, in part,
for determining when high-cost lenders should be incarcerated, it is
also appropriate as a threshold in warning potential victims of the
likelihood of this potentially criminal and predatory behavior.
Second, while the 45% evidentiary threshold in federal law does
not, by itself, establish a criminal limit, many other federal and
state laws, both today and in the past, use an interest rate limit as
the conclusive standard of illegal and, in many states, criminal
behavior. For example, federal law establishes a 36% APR usury
limit on loans made to military service members and their

229. Id. § 892(a).
230. The conference report on the Consumer Credit Protection Act justifies
the 45% evidentiary threshold thus:
Section 892 is in no sense a Federal usury law. The charging of a rate
in excess of 45 percent per annum is merely one of a set of factors
which, where there is inadequate evidence to explain them, are
deemed sufficiently indicative of the existence of criminal means of
collection to justify a statutory inference that such means were, in
fact, contemplated by the parties.
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1397, at 30 (1968) (Conf. Rep.).
231. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 977 (11th ed. 2011).
232. See Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 202,
82 Stat. 146, 159–61 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006))
(stating that an annual actuarial interest rate above 45% is a factor in
establishing prima facie evidence of extortionate credit); see also Edward L.
Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-in-Lending Act,
80 GEO. L.J. 233, 261 (1991) (discussing the House’s 1968 passage of an
amendment to the Truth and Lending Act that labeled “loan sharking” a federal
offense); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 808, 879–80 (2003) (discussing the addition of extortionate credit
provisions to the Truth and Lending Act).
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dependents.233 In the recent past, all fifty states had usury limits on
small consumer loans, typically at a price threshold much lower
than the 45% threshold in this Article’s proposed ordinance.234
Currently, New York City, the nucleus of American finance,
continues to do business without pause under the shadow of a
strictly enforced criminal interest rate limit of 25%.235 Georgia
punishes violations of its usury limit with up to a year in prison.236
Similarly, in Florida, the label “loan shark” is a legal term of art
defined by statute.237 Unlicensed lenders in Florida are guilty of
misdemeanor “loan sharking” when they willfully lend at annual
interest rates in excess of 25%.238 Unlicensed lending at interest
rates of above 45% is punishable as a third-degree felony.239 If in all
these jurisdictions, the government can sue and even imprison
lenders for victimizing borrowers with abusive pricing, surely it is
also appropriate, indeed commendable, to at least provide an

233. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006).
234. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1160–61 (outlining the “usury-limited
credit market” of the 1950s and 1960s).
235. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2011).
236. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(d) (2011).
237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(1)(f) (West 2011) (“‘Loan shark’ means any
person as defined herein who lends money unlawfully under subsection (2), [or]
subsection (3) . . . .”).
238. Id. § 687.071(2). This subsection provides:
Unless otherwise specifically allowed by law, any person making an
extension of credit to any person, who shall willfully and knowingly
charge, take, or receive interest thereon at a rate exceeding 25
percent per annum but not in excess of 45 percent per annum, or the
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period of time, whether directly
or indirectly, or conspires so to do, commits a misdemeanor of the
second degree . . . .
Id.
239. Id. § 687.071(3). This subsection provides:
Unless otherwise specifically allowed by law, any person making an
extension of credit to any person, who shall willfully and knowingly
charge, take, or receive interest thereon at a rate exceeding 45
percent per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter
period of time, whether directly or indirectly, or conspires so to do,
commits a felony of the third degree . . . .
Id.
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effective and prominent warning to borrowers who do not enjoy the
benefit of comparable protections.
Given the tradition and current laws of many states that
outlaw loans at interest rates higher than 45%, some local
government leaders will view this threshold as set too high.
Arguably, it would be more appropriate to set the threshold limit at
36% to mirror the most common American small-loan limit
throughout the twentieth century,240 as well as the federal cap on
loans to military service members.241 Moreover, there are many
financial practices that are fairly characterized as predatory
independent of a 45% interest rate threshold.242 For example, other
abusive payday loan features and practices include: making loans
without considering borrowers’ ability to repay; imposing balloon
payments that force repeated refinancing; using checks or
automated clearing house debit authorizations to coerce repayment;
imposing pyramiding or otherwise excessive late fees; and charging
excessive attorneys’ fees in the collection of small debts—all of
which are independent of the loan’s basically excessive price.
Similarly, in the mortgage lending market, many subprime and
exotic mortgage loans were predatory, not because of their interest
rate, but because they targeted the value of the family’s home or
relied on flawed underwriting.243 Nevertheless, while not every
predatory loan has an interest rate of 45%, many local government
leaders may reasonably conclude that every loan with an interest
rate of 45% is predatory.
Questions are likely to be raised regarding whether a variety of
consumer loans fall within the scope of the proposed model
ordinance. For example, tax-refund-anticipation loans, unsecured
finance company loans, and pawnshop loans can sometimes carry
240. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1142–43, 1161 (discussing a median
usury limit of 36% APR in 1965).
241. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006).
242. See, e.g., ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT. CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOP
PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 28–32 (2002) (listing types
of lenders).
243. See, e.g., Patricia Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of
Predatory Lending Practices, 5 CONSUMER ADVOC. 4 (1999) (listing practices);
Carr & Kolluri, supra note 206, at 32–35 (discussing fraudulent lending
behavior).
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interest rates in excess of 45%. Importantly, lenders can offer all of
these forms of credit at more modest prices when combined with
responsible underwriting and reputable collection methods. But,
insofar as the federal Truth in Lending Act characterizes these
forms of credit as carrying an APR exceeding 45%, the model
ordinance as written will require the same signage warnings that
will almost certainly be imposed on typical payday and car-title
lending companies. Some lenders and merchants are likely to
demand special exceptions under a proposed ordinance. However,
making an exception for one type of merchant, practice, loan term,
or another will open the door to claims of an unlevel playing field. It
will ultimately erode the clear, bright line that is one of the primary
advantages of the ordinance. By hinging the ordinance on federal
law, local governments would harness a pre-existing body of law
that has already had many years of thoughtful interpretation by
regulators and courts. In contrast, as language attempting to grant
exceptions is introduced into the model ordinance, the likelihood of
predatory lenders developing strategies to exploit loopholes will
increase. A 45% APR trigger will provide a high, yet clear, bright
line with low compliance costs for businesses and simple
enforcement for both courts and local governments.
B. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage Ordinance Is Not
Preempted by State Law
There is considerable variation in the powers granted to local
governments to regulate commercial activity. Unlike sovereign state
governments, courts regard local governments as administrative
subdivisions of their states that do not have “inherent” powers.244
Some local governments have “home-rule” authority, generally
thought to include all powers not expressly denied by state
statute.245 Other jurisdictions, in contrast, follow “Dillon’s rule,”
244. 2 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 13:1 (2008).
245. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 135, 138–39 (Mich.
1994) (“[I]t is clear that home rule cities enjoy not only those powers specifically
granted, but they may also exercise all powers not expressly denied.”).
Nevertheless, “courts differ as to the nature of home-rule powers.” MARTINEZ,
supra note 244, § 13:3 (citations omitted). For further description of the law of
home rule, see generally DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR.,
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which holds that local governments have only those powers “granted
in express words” together with those powers necessarily implied or
essentially granted by statute.246 Even under this more restrictive
approach, most states have expressly granted local governments the
broad authority to enact any laws or regulations that are
“reasonably related” to the promotion of “health, safety, morals,
peace, or general welfare.”247 Nevertheless, local governments “may
not enact . . . ordinances which are inconsistent with state law or
which infringe the spirit of state law.”248 Generally speaking, “[a]
state statute preempts municipal ordinances when either the
language in the ordinance contradicts the language in the statute or
when [the judiciary finds that] the [l]egislature has intended to
thoroughly occupy the field [of regulation].”249
Courts have consistently held that, in the absence of express or
field preemption, local authority to regulate for the general welfare
includes authority to regulate consumer finance.250 Most directly, in
the past, some courts recognized the authority of local governments
to directly cap interest rates on consumer loans.251 Looking beyond
the issue of price, courts have upheld local government authority to
issue a wide variety of consumer-financial-services regulations. For
example, courts have generally upheld permit requirements for
HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK (2001).
246. Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (Dillon, C.J.),
superseded by constitutional amendment, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A (1968), as
recognized in City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188 (Iowa 2006);
JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55
(Chicago, James Cockcroft & Co. 1872). The rule is named after John F. Dillon,
an Iowa Supreme Court Justice and Columbia Law Professor. For a more
detailed discussion of jurisprudence in Dillon’s rule jurisdictions, see MARTINEZ,
supra note 244, §§ 13:4–13:9. For a critical analysis of Dillon’s rule and home
rule, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (1990).
247. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 369 (2011) (citations omitted).
248. MARTINEZ, supra note 244, § 13:6; 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal
Corporations § 315 (2010).
249. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 316 (2010) (citations omitted).
250. See 7 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:334 (3d ed.
2005) (“[A] municipality can regulate usury under a general welfare
clause.”(citation omitted)).
251. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Phillips, 85 S.E. 963, 963–64 (S.C. 1915)
(upholding Columbia’s 8% simple nominal annual interest rate limit).
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pawnshops or other types of small consumer finance lenders.252
Permit requirements are usually upheld even when the permit is
duplicative of a state license.253 And in some states, the
enforceability of contracts may be challenged where the lender
failed to obtain a local permit.254 By way of example, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the right of a local government to require
that small lenders record details on every loan made and file weekly
reports to a city auditor.255 The Missouri Supreme Court held that
local governments had the power to require that pawnbrokers take
and maintain a photograph of every customer pawning
merchandise.256 Moreover, courts have generally upheld local
ordinances that impose per-transaction fees on consumer lenders.257
Local law regarding consumer financial services can be enforced
through criminal sanctions, even when those sanctions are
complementary or duplicative of state statutes.258
252. See, e.g., Iscoff v. Police Comm’n of San Francisco, 222 Cal. App. 2d 395,
401–05 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (pawnshop permit); Medias v. City of Indianapolis,
23 N.E.2d 590, 594 (Ind. 1939) (pawnbroker license); City of Rochester v. Bemel,
233 N.W. 862, 863 (Minn. 1930) (junk-dealer license); Provident Loan Soc’y v.
City & County of Denver, 172 P. 10, 12 (Colo. 1918) (pawnbroker license); City
of Seattle v. Barto 71 P. 735, 736 (Wash. 1903) (pawnbroker license); see also
7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 250, § 26:154.3 (collecting and analyzing cases
upholding license requirements for pawnbrokers).
253. See, e.g., Malish v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. App. 4th 725, 736 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he Legislature has expressly authorized duplicative
ordinances regulating pawnbrokers by allowing the enactment and enforcement
of ordinances that are not inconsistent with state law.”); City of New Orleans v.
Heymann, 162 So. 582, 584 (La. 1935) (upholding the city’s license tax on smallloan lenders).
254. See generally Annotation, Failure of Moneylender or Creditor Engaged
in Business of Making Loans to Procure License or Permit as Affecting Validity
or Enforceability of Contract, 29 A.L.R. 4th 884, 884–896 (1984) (discussing the
enforceability of a lender’s contracts when the lender fails to obtain a permit).
255. Sanning v. City of Cincinnati, 90 N.E. 125, 127, 129 (1909).
256. Liberman v. Cervantes, 511 S.W.2d 835, 837–38 (Mo. 1974); see also
Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty., 608 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. 2005) (upholding a local
ordinance requiring pawnbrokers to obtain fingerprints and digital photographs
of customers).
257. See, e.g., USA Cash # 1, Inc. v. City of Saginaw, 776 N.W.2d 346, 357
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that locally imposed, per-transaction fees imposed
on pawnbrokers “do not conflict with state law regulating the same area merely
because the state law imposes no fees”).
258. See, e.g., City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 473 P.2d 917, 920 (N.M. Ct. App.

950

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012)

Moreover, courts have traditionally regarded ordinances
regulating signs as particularly within the authority of local
governments.259 For well over a hundred years, local governments
have been regulating merchants’ outdoor advertising.260 While
authority to regulate signs is not unlimited, from early on, courts
have deferred to local signage ordinances. For example, Chicago
won multiple litigation battles with billboard advertisers in the
early twentieth century.261 Today, there is extensive jurisprudence
granting local governments the power to regulate outdoor signs in
virtually every state in the republic.262 Sign ordinances of many
different types and purposes are routinely upheld, including limits
on their location, construction, maintenance, size, and use.263 A
leading treatise explains that signage ordinances “are to be
sustained upon the basis of promotion of the public safety,
convenience, comfort, morals, and welfare of the inhabitants; more
specifically, they constitute a legitimate exercise of the police
power. . . .”264 While the laws of each state are different, a New York
court explained that municipalities traditionally have “wide
latitude” to adopt ordinances concerning outdoor signs which
“presumptively are valid.”265
1970) (“With the enactment of [a state regulation], there is regulation of
pawnbrokers by both the State and the municipality. The fact of double
regulation does not result in the withdrawal of the municipality’s authority to
regulate. An ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulations.”).
259. See Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. 1992)
(finding that “municipalities have traditionally regulated outdoor advertising
signs through the enforcement of local ordinances”).
260. See Roger A. Cunningham, Billboard Control Under the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1346–47 (1973) (“[C]ases
[from the early 1900s] may be found upholding the validity of municipal
billboard regulation . . . .”).
261. See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 108 N.E. 340, 347 (Ill.
1914), aff’d, 242 U.S. 526 (1917) (“[F]ull power and authority are conferred upon
cities, towns, and villages to regulate the construction and use of billboards
within their corporate limits, provided the regulation is not unreasonable.”
(quoting City of Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 73 N.E. 1035, 1040 (1905))).
262. See 7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 250, § 24:379 (collecting cases granting
authority to local governments to regulate outdoor advertising).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929, 934 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1961) (citations omitted). It is perhaps worth mentioning that Thomas
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Given the strength of authority granting local governments the
power to regulate both consumer finance and outdoor signage, it is
unlikely that courts will find either express or field preemption of
the model small-loan ordinance included in Appendix A. The very
existence of over 130 zoning ordinances specifically targeting highcost, small-loan lenders illustrates that state governments have not
occupied the field of regulation over these lenders in every respect.
Local governments continue to have broad zoning authority over
consumer lenders because, like signage, this method of regulation is
a matter of traditional local authority. Existing state regulations
generally concern only the substantive terms and paperwork
associated with loans.266 A few states require the display of loan
prices or the contact information of state regulators inside lenders’
businesses.267 Virtually no states have adopted consumer financial
regulation on the exterior signage of lender locations. Moreover, a
cautionary exterior signage ordinance would not contradict the
express provisions of state consumer-protection statutes.268
Legislatures that have adopted even the most anemic state payday
and car-title lending laws generally have included laudatory
language in their legislation on the importance of consumer
protection.269 A strongly worded local cautionary signage ordinance
is consistent with the spirit of that public policy. Given the wide
latitude traditionally given to local governments to regulate outdoor
signs, courts should not hold that a local cautionary signage
ordinance is preempted by the law of most states.

Matthews’s influential treatise on model municipal ordinances includes an
extensive list of regulations of all types of signs. See generally 4 THOMAS A.
MATTHEWS, BYRON S. MATTHEWS & JUDITH O’GALLAGHER, MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES: TEXT AND FORMS ch. 51 (3d ed. 2010).
266. For an example of the substantive stipulations, see generally MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 367.021–367.533 (2011).
267. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-401(1) (West 2011) (requiring lenders
to post “a number the person can call to make a complaint to the [Utah
Department of Financial Institutions] regarding the deferred deposit loan”).
268. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 367.185(5) (2011) (“[Lenders] shall post in a
conspicuous location in each licensed office the maximum rates and fees that
such person is currently charging on any loans made.”).
269. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 560.109(1), 560.408 (2011) (stating the intent to
protect the public interest and prevent abuse of consumers).
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C. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage Ordinance Is
Constitutional

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”270 and the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
restrictions on state and local governments.271 The constitutional
freedom of speech is a reflection of the American people’s “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”272 Nevertheless, not
all forms of speech are treated the same under the Constitution.
There are two potential lines of cases that courts might use to
analyze the constitutionality of the proposed cautionary signage
ordinance: first, the government speech doctrine, and second, the
compelled commercial speech doctrine.273 With respect to the
former, “[t]he government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and
correspondingly imprecise.”274 Courts are still gradually sorting out
the criteria that will define when a communication constitutes the
government’s own speech communicated with the assistance of
private parties and when it constitutes private speech that the
government compels.275 Moreover, there does not appear to be a
consensus on the Supreme Court as to what distinguishes these
forms of constitutional analysis.276 Both types of government action
270. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
271. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that “freedom
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the [s]tates”).
272. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
273. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637–38, 651 (1985) (discussing government speech and
compelled commercial speech).
274. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
275. See Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV.
365, 366 (2009) (“[T]he Court has yet to announce a standard by which judges
can reliably identify government speech across a range of cases.”).
276. For example, compare Johanns, 554 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“[A] compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by speech unless the
government must put that speech forward as its own.”), with id. at 564 n.7
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are potentially constitutional, but the analysis and scrutiny applied
by the Supreme Court differs. This subpart argues that the
proposed cautionary signage ordinance is best viewed as
constitutionally permissible government speech. But, even if courts
determine that the warning signs are private speech, the ordinance
is nonetheless a constitutional form of compelled commercial speech.
1. The Government Speech Doctrine
The proposed cautionary signage ordinance engages in
constitutionally permissible government speech. In recent years, the
United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Government’s
own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”277 The
First Amendment precludes the government from impermissibly
restricting freedom of speech, but it does not preclude the
government from speaking. Thus, “[a] government entity has the
right to ‘speak for itself.’”278 Indeed, government is “entitled to say
what it wishes” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”279
There are several examples of courts approving local
government textual displays under the government speech doctrine.
Most prominently, in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,280 the
Supreme Court held that a monument reciting the Ten
Commandments was a form of government speech not subject to
First Amendment scrutiny.281 A small religious group, called
Summum, challenged Pleasant Grove City when the city refused to
(majority opinion) (“[T]he correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience
realizes the Government is speaking . . . . [R]espondents enjoy no right not to
fund government speech—whether by broad-based taxes or targeted
assessments, and whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the
speech as the government’s.”); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“To date, our decisions relying on
the recently minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action
have been few, and in my view, of doubtful merit.”).
277. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at
553).
278. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
279. Id. at 467–68 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Id. at 460.
281. Id. at 480.
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allow the creed to donate its own religious monument for display
alongside the city’s Ten Commandments monument.282 While the
case also raised questions under the Establishment Clause, the
Court granted certiorari specifically to analyze the right of
governments to speak.283 Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
emphasized that “[g]overnments have long used monuments to
speak to the public.”284 The Court explained that, although city
parks create a public forum for some purposes, no First Amendment
values were offended by the government’s selective display of a
religious monument.285
Although Pleasant Grove City dealt with a local government’s
permanent monument, lower courts have applied the same doctrine
to more temporary local government textual displays. For example,
in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District,286 the Ninth Circuit
reviewed a public school teacher’s constitutional challenge to school
officials’ refusal to allow him to post materials on a bulletin board
reflecting differing viewpoints on the school’s gay and lesbian
awareness month.287 A Los Angeles public school maintained a
school bulletin board on which faculty and staff could post
materials.288 Typical messages included content emphasizing
acceptance of diversity and opposition to bullying.289 The school
principal refused to allow the teacher to maintain a separate
bulletin board with material challenging the morality of homosexual
and lesbian behavior.290 The Ninth Circuit held that the school’s
sign was government speech and therefore immune from First

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 464–66.
Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 470 (majority opinion).
Id. at 480–81.
Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1005–06.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1006–07.
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Amendment scrutiny.291 “Viewpoint neutrality” analysis did not
apply “because it [was] a case of the government itself speaking.”292
Similarly, a third case dealt with the tobacco industry’s
challenge to a state government’s imposition of a surtax on cigarette
sales to fund an anti-tobacco advertising campaign that included
billboard messages along with radio, television, and print
advertising.293 Among other messages, the advertising campaign
included television advertisements displaying the text “WARNING:
The tobacco industry is not your friend” and “WARNING: Some
people will say anything to sell cigarettes.”294 Rejecting the
application of the compelled speech doctrine, the court instead
applied the government speech doctrine in finding the speech
constitutional.295
A more difficult question arises in determining what
communications are government speech when there is some
combination of private and public action. However, the government
“is not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources.”296 The Supreme Court has held that “[a] government
entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of
delivering a government-controlled message.”297 Similarly, the
government may speak without First Amendment scrutiny where it
“regulate[s] the content of what is or is not expressed . . . when it
enlists private entities to convey its own message.”298 For example,
in Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court considered the Ten
Commandments monument at issue to be government speech even

291. Id. at 1013 (“We conclude that when a public high school is the speaker,
its control of its own speech is not subject to the constraints of constitutional
safeguards and forum analysis . . . .”).
292. Id. at 1011.
293. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005).
294. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id. at 920.
296. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
297. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009).
298. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995).
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though private citizens fabricated and donated the sign itself.299
Similarly, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Supreme
Court reviewed a congressional program forcing farmers to
subsidize a government advertising campaign promoting beef.300
Despite the compelled private support for the program and the use
of private entities in producing the advertising campaign, the Court
nonetheless upheld the program as government speech.301
The key criteria announced by the Court in distinguishing
government from private speech are whether the government
“‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent” and whether the
government is “exercising ‘final approval authority’ over [its]
selection.”302 A federal district judge has emphasized that “[t]he
determination as to whether speech is properly characterized as
government speech or private speech turns entirely on ‘who is
responsible for the speech.’”303 Several Supreme Court Justices have
also emphasized that government speech is immune from First
Amendment scrutiny only where it is clear that the government is
speaking, as opposed to a private party.304 The government is not
allowed to avoid electoral accountability for its speech by concealing
its message within the voice of private entities.305
In the proposed cautionary signage ordinance, a local
government adopting the ordinance would “effectively control” the
message conveyed in the municipal signs because the language of
the signs is crafted within the city or county’s legislative process.
299. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464–65.
300. Johanns, 554 U.S. at 553–55.
301. Id.
302. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 473 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at
560–61).
303. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d. 1085, 1100 (E.D.
Cal. 2003).
304. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The
government may not, consistent with the First Amendment, associate
individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by attributing an
unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals fund the speech,
and whether or not the message is under the government’s control.”); id. at 569
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“I resist ranking the promotional
messages funded under . . . [an Act of Congress], but not attributed to the
Government, as Government speech . . . .”).
305. Id. at 577–79 (Souter, J., dissenting).

“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER”

957

Indeed, there is even greater government control under the
proposed ordinance than in either Pleasant Grove City or Johanns.
In the former, the sign itself was created and donated by private
citizens.306 In the latter, the Court held that the beef advertising
campaign was government speech even though the advertisements
were produced and directed by private contractors, subject to
approval by the government.307 In the case of the proposed
ordinance, the government not only effectively controls the message;
indeed, it completely controls it by permitting no language other
than the words the city or county government itself has spoken.
Moreover, there is no question that the cities and counties
adopting the proposed ordinance would exercise final approval
authority over the cautionary signs by voting in the legislative
process to speak the very message adopted by the ordinance. Just as
Pleasant Grove City had final approval authority on whether to
display the donated Ten Commandments monument,308 so too
would local governments have final approval on the precise wording
and format of predatory lender warning signs. In both the Pleasant
Grove City display and the proposed ordinance, a local government
is displaying language that it approves of and is accountable for.
While it is true that predatory lenders are likely to object to the
message of the cautionary signage ordinance, there is no
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the government speech
doctrine as applied to the proposed ordinance. High-cost lenders
have no right to force the government to only say things that
lenders agree with. As Justice Scalia has observed, “It is the very
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”309
There is no credible argument that, by speaking to citizens in their
own voices, local governments will close off a public forum of debate,
since predatory lenders are free (and entirely likely) to respond
vigorously with their own views. Similar to the school bulletin board
in Downs, in the case of the proposed cautionary signage

306. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009).
307. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 566–67.
308. Please Grove City, 555 U.S. at 473.
309. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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ordinance,“[w]e do not face an example of the government opening
up a forum for either unlimited or limited public discussion.”310
Furthermore, the proposed signage ordinance poses no risk that
the source of the government speech will be misattributed to a nongovernmental speaker. The signage ordinance’s warning is “clearly
identified as coming from the government itself.”311 To further
emphasize the government as the source of the speech, the
ordinance calls on the government to use its official municipal seal
to visually reinforce that the language is the government speaking
rather than the lender or some other private entity. There is no risk
that the public will be unable to decipher the source of the
cautionary message and thereby be frustrated in electoral efforts to
hold the government accountable for its speech.
Predatory lenders will perhaps argue that the fact that
warnings are displayed on private property precludes application of
the government speech doctrine.312 However, nothing in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on government speech points to the
physical location of the speech as dispositive. Rather, the Court has
focused on the government’s control of the message and final
approval of content as the defining characteristics of government
speech. Indeed, in Johanns, the Court found that the beef
310. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000).
311. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 920 (9th Cir. 2005).
312. For those local governments unwilling to risk a First Amendment
challenge, another policy option would be simply installing government created,
owned, and maintained warning signs as close as possible to predatory lending
locations. Most American cities and counties retain ownership of a small strip of
land separating public roads from merchants’ private property. Such a strategy
would be the surest ordinance to survive constitutional challenge because it
would avoid the use of any private action or property. Moreover, the cost of
designing, installing, and maintaining warning signs could be raised from
revenue generated through predatory lending permit fees. The mere fact that
predatory lenders would have to pay for government warning signs would not
detract from the constitutionality of the ordinance because “compelled funding
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.” Johanns
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 554 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). Moreover, this analysis is
altogether unaffected by whether the funds for the warning signs are “raised by
general taxes or through a targeted assessment.” Id. at 562. “Citizens may
challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment
right not to fund government speech. And that is no less true when the funding
is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to
which the assessed citizens object.” Id.
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advertising campaign was government speech even though the
advertisements were produced by marketing firms on private
property, broadcast from private television and radio stations, and
viewed in private homes and private businesses. The proposed
ordinance’s use of existing signage is best viewed from a
constitutional perspective as government speech that “merely . . .
solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources.”313 If adopted,
courts should view the proposed ordinance “as an avenue for the
representation of citizens’ higher-minded desires even when as
consumers they act with perhaps lower-minded motives.”314
2. The Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine
Even if the courts somehow decide that the proposed local
government signs are private speech, the ordinance is nevertheless
likely an example of constitutionally permissible compelled
commercial speech. The core purpose of freedom of speech is to
“assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.”315 In furtherance
of this purpose, the Supreme Court has most closely scrutinized
what Robert Post has called “public discourse,” the nature of which
is “to ensure that a democratic state remains responsive to the
views of its citizens.”316 While commercial speech also receives
constitutional protection, the Court less closely scrutinizes this form
of expression.317
Although the Court has had difficulty articulating the boundary
between public discourse and commercial speech, in the seminal
case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the Supreme Court defined commercial speech as an
313. Id.
314. Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1667, 1683–84 (2001).
315. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
316. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 4 (2000).
317. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
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“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”318 At other times, the Court has pointed to
“speech that proposes a commercial transaction” as the hallmark of
commercial expression.319 Additionally, other cases have pointed to
speech constituting an advertisement, speech that refers to a
product or service, and economically motivated speech as indicative
characteristics of commercial expression.320 Despite these attempts
at defining commercial speech, this category of First Amendment
analysis has been controversial and, in the view of some,
inconsistent.321
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has tolerated more aggressive
government regulation of commercial speech for at least two
reasons:
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the
market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to
evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the
underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring
of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation.322

Furthermore, government action that merely compels speech, such
as warnings or disclosures, receives less constitutional scrutiny than

318. Id. at 561.
319. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993)
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)).
320. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983); see also
Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159,
168 (2009).
321. See Post, supra note 316, at 2 (explaining that commercial speech
doctrine is “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment
jurisprudence”). Former Chief Justice Rehnquist notably argued that
commercial speech ought to receive no constitutional protection at all. Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 598–99 (1980)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Many scholars have agreed. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 812–18 (1999); C. Edwin Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3
(1976); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 352–55 (1978).
322. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
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restrictions of speech.323 The Supreme Court has explained that less
constitutional scrutiny is appropriate “[w]hen a State regulates
commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading,
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of
beneficial consumer information, [because] the purpose of its
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional
protection to commercial speech.”324 The Supreme Court has not
viewed the withholding of commercial information—that is, the
right not to speak—as a fundamental right when a commercial
speaker is marketing her services.325 As the Second Circuit has
stated, in contrast to restrictions of speech, “disclosure furthers,
rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of
truth and contributes to the efficiency of the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”326 Accordingly, “less exacting scrutiny is required than
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.”327
In sum, the First Amendment is satisfied “as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.”328 The majority in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel329 explained that “in virtually all our
commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that
323. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)
(stating that warnings and disclosures receive “less than strict review”).
324. Id.; see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d
Cir. 2001); see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006) (reporting of federal election campaign
contributions); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006) (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(2006) (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2006) (nutritional labeling); 33
U.S.C. §1318 (2006) (reporting of pollutant concentrations in discharges to
water); 42 U.S.C. §11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R.
§ 202.1 (2011) (disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R.
§1910.1200 (2011) (posting notification of workplace hazards).
325. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14
(1985) (“The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information
regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental right.”).
326. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 114.
327. Id.; see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 769
n.9 (1988) (stating that “[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to
compelled disclosure requirements” than is personal or political speech).
328. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (stating that when the government
“impose[s] a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on
speech . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer . . . governs”).
329. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626.
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because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warnings
or disclaimers might be appropriately required in order to dissipate
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”330 In applying
these constitutional principles, courts have upheld “[i]nnumerable
federal and state regulatory programs [that] require the disclosure
of product and other commercial information.”331
The proposed predatory-lender-warning ordinance is properly
viewed by courts as a constitutionally permissible warning
requirement. Unlike, for example, signs and billboards used in
political election campaigns, the signs outside payday and car-title
lending locations are displayed entirely for commercial purposes.
They are designed to solicit and encourage customers to borrow
money. Moreover, the cautionary signage ordinance is itself
designed to provide warning information to citizens who
contemplate engaging in these entirely private transactions. The
ordinance’s warning requirement does not affect how people interact
with the state, nor does it affect the communication associated with
lenders’ personal affairs. The ordinance also does not interfere with
the relationship between borrowers and predatory lenders. Lenders
remain free to, for example, charge ruinous interest rates to poor
families. Moreover, the ordinance does not attempt to prohibit or
restrict any speech by predatory lenders.332 Unlike many laws, such
as advertising bans, the ordinance does not limit any speech by
anyone. Rather, it merely adds a cautionary note authored by the
government as advice to borrowers of the significant risks of high
interest rate loans. Notwithstanding the warning requirement,
predatory lenders would remain free to continue advertising their
330. Id. at 651 (citations, ellipses, and original alterations omitted).
331. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (upholding the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act’s requirement that cigarette packages contain warnings).
332. Cf. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (stating that government
“may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive”); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, MediumSpecific Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 259, 290–91 (2007) (pointing to disclosure requirements as a lessrestrictive means of speech regulation on attorney advertising).
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services in any non-deceptive way they choose. Nothing in the
proposed ordinance requires lenders to repeat an objectionable
message out of their own mouths.333 Indeed, predatory lenders could
counteract the local government’s warning within their store
signage itself. Given the triple-digit interest rate profit incentives of
predatory lenders, we should expect this type of counteractive
speech to be just the sort of “hardy breed of expression” that courts
need not be overly concerned with stifling.334 The consumerprotection-oriented nature of the ordinance is squarely within the
policy goals at the heart of the subordinate constitutional protection
of commercial speech.
The proposed ordinance is reasonably designed to counteract
the confusing and deceptive speech of predatory lenders. As
Professor Post has observed, the Supreme Court has deployed
weaker constitutional protection in “social settings that . . . involve
persons who are deemed dependent, vulnerable, or not fully
rational.”335 Part III of this Article sets out empirical evidence of
common behavioral patterns that inhibit the ability of borrowers to
make rational and fully informed decisions in this market. It is
reasonable for local governments to conclude that a provocative and
prominent warning is needed to counteract the ability of predatory
lenders to systematically manipulate borrowers’ less than fully
rational behavior. Local governments are on a firm empirical
foundation in believing that borrowers are unrealistically optimistic
about their ability to repay high-cost debts that are aggressively
marketed by predatory lenders.336 At the most basic level, the very
names of many leading lenders in this market are, arguably,
misleading. Many lenders have names emphasizing speed,
convenience, and ease of access. Examples of small loan chains with
this type of brand identity include: ACE Cash Express, Cash Loans
Now, Cash N Run, Check ‘n’ Go, EZCash, FastBuck$,
333. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (finding
that the government may not compel children, contrary to their conscience, to
salute the American flag).
334. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 549 n.16 (5th Cir.
2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)).
335. Post, supra note 316, at 4.
336. See supra notes 67–90 and accompanying text.
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FastCash4You, Money Now, Quick Cash Financial Services, and
SpeedyCash. It is not a coincidence that all of these brands
emphasize “cash now” instead of “crushing interest payments later.”
Local government leaders would be reasonable in finding that many
borrowers would benefit from a strong cautionary message because
of borrowers’ tendency to unwisely discount the value of future
wealth and to exhibit distress-induced, abbreviated reasoning
patterns.
Moreover, local governments could reasonably conclude that
many borrowers have great difficulty in processing and comparing
even basic financial and legal information necessary to compare
value in consumer finance.337 While payday and car-title lenders
argue their contracts are simple, their contracts often impose many
contingent and confusing fees and practices including “default
rates,” “service charges,” “insufficient funds fees,” “returned check
fees,” “collection costs,” “late fees,” “renewal fees,” “court costs,”
“process service fees,” “filling fees,” and “attorneys’ fees.”338 For the
millions of Americans who lack even basic qualitative and
quantitative literacy, these contracts are complicated and difficult to
compare. Because default is common in the industry, these difficultto-compare contingent fees are likely to have a greater effect on true
costs in comparison to more mainstream financial products.
Many borrowers have virtually no incentive to comparison-shop
because they realize that they will not be able to spot the various
tricks and traps predatory lenders lay in the inscrutable boilerplate
legal provisions that accompany even relatively simple loans. A
person of minimal quantitative and legal literacy may rationally
recognize that the transactional costs of identifying which lenders
have hidden tricks and traps within their adhesive boilerplate dwarf
the potential utility from what may be a futile exercise in shopping.
In a heterogeneously segmented market, there is no guarantee that
any lender will offer a credit-impaired borrower better terms,
preferring to compete through aggressive collection practices
instead of low, transparent pricing. Moreover, borrowers’ perception
of the incentive to incur shopping costs may be informed by the fact
337. See supra notes 91–114 and accompanying text.
338. All fees are taken from sample payday loan contracts on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review.
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that in many consumer contexts, the law allows businesses to
unilaterally change the terms of a consumer’s deal after the fact
anyway.339 Even rational borrowers should discount the prospective
benefit of shopping based on the realization that they have a very
minimal chance of gaining access to counsel or a fair day in court to
enforce those provisions of the agreement that might actually favor
them.340
339. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2010) (describing when a
creditor is required to give notice of changes that the creditor makes to a homeequity plan); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that a consumer is bound by terms received after payment if the
consumer does not return the product); Alces & Greenfield, supra note 12, at
1145 (“Use of contract provisions that authorize the dominant party to change
the terms of the contract at will are omnipresent in a wide range of contracts for
credit and services.”); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1099, 1109 (2004) (“[T]he deal [in Hill] had
been closed in commercial understanding and the vendor subsequently sought
to establish further terms to an existing contract.”).
340. Compare DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) (“[A]bout
four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the
needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”), CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
COURTS AND THE POOR 11 (1991) (discussing wealth discrimination in the court
system), Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society
Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 683 (2010) (describing “equal
justice for all” as “an aspiration, not reality”), Russell Engler, Connecting SelfRepresentation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel
is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 92 (2010) (arguing for an expanded
right to civil counsel), Russell Engler, Pursuing Access to Justice and Civil Right
to Counsel in a Time of Economic Crisis, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 472, 498
(2010) (“Tabling the concept of an expanded right to counsel turns as essential
component of a fair judicial system into a luxury item.”), Jona Goldschmidt, The
Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 37 (2002)
(“[P]ro se litigants . . . often encounter bench and bar resistence.”), Robert A.
Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor,
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 3 (2008) (“All too often immigrants are deprived of
adequate legal representation . . . .”), Gene R. Nichol Jr., Judicial Abdication
and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 325, 327
(2010) (characterizing “our strongest and most pervasive transgression against
access and equality” as the poor’s “exclusion from the effective use of our civil
justice system”), and LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS
27–28 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/
documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (describing the importance
of providing the poor with civil legal assistance), with Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
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Predatory lenders’ best argument will be that the label
“predatory” is so pejorative that it cannot be characterized as
commercial speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
Although a few lower courts have attempted to argue that the
Zauderer standard of scrutiny can only be applied to
“uncontroversial information,”341 the Supreme Court has primarily
focused on whether warnings are accurate statements.342 Thus the
Court insists: “The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge
accurate information regarding his services is not such a
fundamental right.”343 Local governments should argue that the
word is an accurate description given the abusive commercial
practices prevalent in this industry. The word “predatory” is
commonly defined as “inclined . . . to injure or exploit others for
personal gain or profit.”344 At least eleven different federal
regulatory agencies have publicly used the term “predatory” to
describe some form of abusive lending.345 The label is commonly
used by scholars and the press in describing lending regulated by
the ordinance.346 Indeed, the word “predatory” has only come into
common usage in recent years as a substitute for the adjective
“criminal,” which had been, and still is, used in many states to
describe these loans for hundreds of years. That Congress and many
states have used a 45% interest rate as a criterion in establishing a

of law . . . . Left without the aid of counsel . . . . [h]e lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one.” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))).
341. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No.11-1482, 2011 WL 5307391,
at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011) (describing “the Zauderer exception for purely
factual and uncontroversial information”).
342. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(“[W]e hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing the deception of consumers.”).
343. Id.
344. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 977 (11th ed. 2011).
345. See Peterson, supra note 31, at 5 (collecting examples).
346. See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Paul Wiseman & John Waggoner, 7 Things
that Helped Break the Economy . . . And How Congress Aims to Fix Them, USA
TODAY, June 28, 2010, at 1B (“At the core of the spiral: No regulatory authority
had sole responsibility for protecting consumers from predatory lending and
other abuses.”).

“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER”

967

loan’s criminality is evidence that the term “predatory” is factual.347
While the term “predatory” may exist at the outer bounds of
commercial speech, it is factually appropriate for commerce at the
outer bounds of legally acceptable behavior.
While criminality is not a standard courts use to judge the
constitutionality of compelled speech, it would nevertheless be an
odd constitution that allows government to incarcerate people to
prevent predatory lending but forbids government from deploying
strongly worded warnings. Where a business solicits consumers to
engage in a transaction that has been widely treated as criminally
abusive for nearly three hundred years, the Constitution ought not
to require only uselessly insipid, wishy-washy, and milquetoast
warnings. The Constitution does not prevent the government from
using “plain English” to warn vulnerable citizens about financial
predators.348 The judicial preference for decorum is not a
constitutional requirement. Recognizing this point, former Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that if courts hold otherwise, “[l]oan
sharks might well choose States with unregulated small loan
industries, luring the unwary with immune commercial
advertisements.”349 Surely if the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
can label high-cost, small-loan lenders “loan sharks,” local
governments are on a firm rhetorical footing with the relatively
restrained label of “predatory lender.” As the former Chief Justice
347. See infra Part V.A and accompanying text.
348. See Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 767 (5th Cir. 2008)
(upholding a congressional statute requiring that attorneys describe themselves
as “debt relief agencies”); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d
906, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a cigarette surtax funded public
advertising campaign that attacked “not ‘the desirability of a product but . . . the
moral character of [the] industry, accusing it of hypocrisy, cynicism and
duplicity”); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512,
530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (rejecting application of strict scrutiny to tobacco industry’s
First Amendment challenge to FDA graphic cigarette warning labels). But see
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA, No. 11-1482, 2011 WL 5307391, at *6–
8 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down the FDA’s
graphic cigarette warning labels).
349. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 835–36 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, a search of Westlaw’s Supreme Court Decisions database
indicates that the United States Supreme Court has used the term “predatory”
in various criminal and civil contexts in at least 109 different published
opinions.
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seems to have recognized, it is factually accurate to characterize
lions, tigers, bears, and loan sharks as predatory.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has explored local government ordinances and
resolutions that attempt to inhibit predatory lending within their
communities. A growing trend of local government action has
emerged following the failure of federal and state leaders to provide
effective consumer protection laws. This vacuum in leadership on
small, high-cost loans has developed despite the great majority of
Americans who support banning predatory loans. Federal and state
preemption of local financial regulation have left local governments
with limited authority to act on their constituents’ wishes. However,
because local governments traditionally have had broad authority to
regulate merchants’ exterior signage, this Article suggests using
that power to protect families from predatory loans. In particular,
this Article proposes a model ordinance requiring that lenders
offering loans with APRs in excess of 45% display a cautionary
message that reads “Warning: Predatory Lender,” on their street,
storefront, and other on-premises exterior signs. While these
signage requirements are in some respects unusual, this flows from
the great disparity in the wishes of the public and the law as it has
come to be controlled by the powerful business interests that exert
pressure on key financial services committees in state legislatures
and Congress. Providing a strongly worded message of caution on
exterior signs to warn predatory loan borrowers would allow local
governments to seize the initiative to help vulnerable families.
Given the strong empirical, historical, and moral evidence
suggesting that predatory small loans are destructive for borrowers,
their families, and our communities, local government leaders
should use their offices to protect the citizens who elected them.
Appendix A. Model Predatory Small Loan Ordinance
[Insert Jurisdiction] ORDINANCE No. ____
PREDATORY SMALL LOAN ORDINANCE
WHEREAS, there exist business practices, commonly referred to
as “predatory lending,” whereby businesses lend small sums of
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money at usurious and unconscionable interest rates to low- and
moderate-income persons; and
WHEREAS, small predatory loans have an unreasonably adverse
effect upon the elderly, young families, members of our armed
services and their families, the economically disadvantaged, and
other citizens of [insert jurisdiction]; and
WHEREAS, many predatory loan borrowers lack bargaining
power and financial experience and have difficulty evaluating the
risks, prices, and consequences associated with high-cost debts;
and predatory loans cater to impulse borrowing that funds illicit
drug use, gambling, and other activities that are otherwise
deleterious of public thrift; and
WHEREAS, predatory lenders falsely advertise their loans as
fast and convenient, when in fact many borrowers fall captive to
protracted cycles of repeat borrowing; and
WHEREAS, predatory lending causes families to default on
mortgage, rent, and utility payments; delay needed medical care;
and lose their bank accounts; and
WHEREAS, predatory lending locations increase crime; and
WHEREAS, usurious lending is immoral and contrary to the
values of the residents of [insert jurisdiction]; and
WHEREAS, many less expensive and less dangerous personal
finance options are widely available to [insert jurisdiction]
residents through banks, thrifts, credit unions, pawnbrokers, and
merchants; and
WHEREAS, the federal government has determined that annual
interest rates above 45% are indicative of predatory loan
sharking; and
WHEREAS, predatory lending was illegal and a criminal act
throughout most of American history, including all thirteen
original states, and in the state of [insert state]; and
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council
of [insert jurisdiction] ordains as follows:
PART I. Chapter [insert appropriate chapter] of the [insert
jurisdiction] Code is hereby enacted to read as follows:
Table of Contents
Section 100. Title for Citation
Section 200. Legislative Findings
Section 300. Definitions
Section 400. Administrative Authority
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Section 500. Licensing
Section 600. Signage
Section 700. Enforcement
Section 800. Severability
Section 100. Title for Citation
The ordinance codified in this chapter shall be known and may be
referred to as the PREDATORY SMALL LOAN ORDINANCE.
Section 200. Legislative Findings
The [insert jurisdiction] Council finds as follows:
(a) There exist business practices, commonly referred to as
“predatory lending,” whereby businesses lend small sums of
money at usurious and unconscionable interest rates to low- and
moderate-income persons and target members of our armed
services and their families; and
(b) Small predatory loans have an unreasonably adverse effect
upon the elderly, young families, the economically
disadvantaged, members of our armed services and their
families, and other citizens of [insert jurisdiction]; and
(c) Many predatory loan borrowers lack bargaining power and
financial experience and have difficulty evaluating the risks,
prices, and consequences associated with high cost debts; and
predatory loans cater to impulse borrowing that funds illicit drug
use, gambling, and other activities that are otherwise deleterious
of public thrift; and
(d) Predatory lenders falsely advertise their loans as fast and
convenient, when in fact many borrowers fall captive to
protracted cycles of repeat borrowing; and
(e) Predatory lending causes families to default on mortgage,
rent, and utility payments; delay needed medical care; and lose
their bank accounts; and
(f) Predatory lending locations increase crime; and
(g) Usurious lending is immoral and contrary to the values of the
residents of [insert jurisdiction]; and many less expensive and
less dangerous personal finance options are widely available to
[insert jurisdiction] residents through banks, thrifts, credit
unions, pawnbrokers, and merchants; and
(h) The federal government has determined that annual interest
rates above 45% are indicative of predatory loan sharking; and
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(i) Predatory lending was illegal and a criminal act throughout
most of American history, including all thirteen original states,
and in the state of [insert state]; and
Official Comments:
1. The characterization of loans with exorbitant interest rates as
“predatory” in subsection (h) is intended to reflect the policy
objectives of federal law. Under current federal criminal law, an
annual actuarial interest rate in excess of 45% is considered
prima facie evidence that the loan is extortionate. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 892(b)(2) (2011). While there are additional elements present in
the criminal prosecution of extortionate lending, the prima facie
evidentiary threshold of 45% reflects congressional judgment that
prices above this interest rate are indicative of criminal, and by
implication predatory, behavior. The term “predatory” reflects
Congress’s judgment that loans in excess of 45% are inclined to

injure or exploit borrowers for personal gain or profit.
Because this threshold is used by Congress as a legal device
suitable for determining when high-cost lenders should be
incarcerated, it is also appropriate as a threshold in warning
potential victims of the likelihood of this potentially criminal and
predatory behavior. The characterization of loans with interest
rates in excess of 45% as predatory is supportive of existing
federal law by warning borrowers regarding interest rates that
Congress considers prima facie evidence of extortionate loan
sharking. Because loans with exorbitant interest rates can be
characterized as extortionate for purposes of criminal law, they
can also be characterized as predatory for purposes of consumer
protection law.
Section 300. Definitions
As used in this Chapter unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) “Annual Percentage Rate” shall be defined in accordance with
federal law.
(b) “Director” means the Director of the [insert appropriate
administrative department].
(c) “Predatory Lender” means any person or entity that lends,
brokers, or in any way extends a predatory small loan.
(d) “Predatory Lending Facility” means any location where a
predatory lender conducts business.
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(e) “Predatory Small Loan” means an extension of credit made at
an annual percentage rate in excess of 45%.
(f) “Warning Sign” means a sign required by this ordinance that
includes the language “[INSERT JURISDICTION] WARNING:
PREDATORY LENDER.”
Official Comments:
1. Subparagraph (a) and (e), in combination with Section 600,
indicate that this ordinance applies to all lenders who make
extensions of credit in excess of an annual percentage rate of
45%. Since this ordinance defers to federal law on the definition
of an annual percentage rate, the scope of this ordinance is
coextensive with federal law as it is currently articulated in the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Insofar as a financial
service does not carry an annual percentage rate under federal
law, the signage requirements of this ordinance would not apply
to that transaction. However, if federal law characterizes a
service as imposing an annual percentage rate, the service is
within the scope of this ordinance at the point that the rate
exceeds 45%.
Section 400. Administrative Authority
(a) The Director is authorized and directed to enforce all
provisions of this Chapter. The Director shall have the power to
investigate any and all complaints regarding alleged violations of
this Chapter. The Director may delegate any or all authority
granted under this Section to any supervisor, employee, or agent.
(b) The Director is authorized to adopt and enforce
administrative rules interpreting and applying this Chapter. The
Director or designee shall make written findings of fact and
conclusions of law to support all decisions.
(c) Prior to adoption of a new administrative rule, the Director
shall give notice to all interested parties of the terms of the
proposed rule and shall conduct a public hearing to consider
public comment. Public notices shall be given when
administrative rules have been adopted.
(1) At the public hearing, the Director or designee shall hear
oral and written testimony concerning the proposed rule. The
Director shall have the power to establish and limit the matters
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to be considered at the hearing, to prescribe procedures for the
conduct of the hearings, to hear evidence, and to preserve order.
(2) The Director or designee shall adopt, modify, or reject the
proposed ruling after considering testimony received during the
public hearing.
(3) Unless otherwise stated, all rules shall be effective upon
adoption by the Director.
(4) The Director shall take reasonable and customary steps
to make all final rules available to the public.
(5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this Section,
the Director may adopt an interim rule without prior public
notice upon a finding that failure to act promptly may result in
serious prejudice to the public interest or the interests of the
affected parties. Such interim rules shall detail the specific
reasons for such prejudice. Any interim rule adopted pursuant to
this paragraph shall be effective for a period not to exceed 180
days.
Section 500. Licensing
(a) Within 90 days of the effective date of the ordinance enacted
in this Chapter, any predatory lender operating in [insert
jurisdiction] shall apply for and obtain a permit to operate as a
predatory lender. Permits shall be required for each location a
lender operates in [insert jurisdiction] and shall be renewed
annually. The application shall be in a form to be determined by
the Director or the Director’s designee. No person shall operate a
predatory lending business located in [insert jurisdiction] without
a current permit to do business issued by [insert jurisdiction].
(b) The annual permit fee for each location shall be $10,000 in the
first year following enactment of this ordinance. In each
subsequent year following enactment of this ordinance, the
Director shall adjust the annual permit fee to account for
inflation or deflation based on the Consumer Price Index as
calculated by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of
Labor Statistics or based on another comparable measure of price
change designated by the Director.
(c) Predatory lending permits shall be required in addition to the
[insert jurisdiction] business license required by section [insert
appropriate code section] of the [insert jurisdiction] Code.
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Official Comments:
The predatory lending permit requirement of this Section is not
intended to replace the normal business operating licenses
customarily required by most cities and counties. Rather it is
intended as an additional permit focused on businesses making
high-cost consumer loans. The purpose of this permit
requirement is to assist the Director in monitoring compliance
with the Predatory Small Loan Ordinance as well as to generate
revenue to cover the operating costs of local government.
Section 600. Signage
(a) It is unlawful and a violation of this code for any predatory
lender to operate a predatory lending facility, unless the premises
where the predatory lending facility is operated displays exterior
signs conforming to the requirements of this section.
(b) All exterior signs displayed at the business location of a
predatory lender shall be modified to include the [insert
jurisdiction] disclosure statement:
“[INSERT JURISDICTION]
WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER.” The [insert jurisdiction]
disclosure statement shall substantially occupy 33% of the spatial
area on all signs governed by this section. The 33% area allocated
for the disclosure statement shall be composed of a black, Arial,
all-capitals text on a white background.
(c) Predatory lenders operating within [insert jurisdiction] shall
obtain and display official [insert jurisdiction] predatory lending
door signs on all exterior doors at any predatory lending facility.
(d) The Director shall design and distribute to predatory lending
facility permit holders official [insert jurisdiction] predatory
lending door signs. The predatory lending door sign shall be
designed to be visible by persons entering the predatory lending
facility. The predatory lending door sign shall be designed to
substantially occupy the entire spatial area of exterior doors at
the predatory lending facility. The director shall, in his or her
discretion, have the authority to provide different types of official
predatory lending door signs to accommodate mounting such
signs on different types of exterior doors, so long as these
variations are otherwise in compliance with the requirements of
this Section.
(e) Official [insert jurisdiction] predatory lending door signs shall
have black, Arial, all-capitals text with a white background. Such
door signs shall display the disclosure statement: “[INSERT
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JURISDICTION] WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER.” In addition, the
official door sign shall include the following explanatory
comment: “[Insert jurisdiction] has determined that this facility
engages in predatory lending. [Insert jurisdiction] has required
this lender to display consumer protection warnings. This
predatory lending facility lends at interest rates above 45%.
These loans can cause bounced checks, penalty fees,
repossessions, lawsuits, and severe financial hardship.”
(f) All signs required by this Section shall display the [insert
jurisdiction] official seal.
Official Comments:
1. The purpose of this Section is to warn consumers about the
risks associated with small predatory loans. Many predatory
loan borrowers lack bargaining power and financial experience
and have difficulty evaluating the risks, prices, and consequences
associated with high-costs debt. Moreover, many predatory
lenders inaccurately characterize their loans as fast and
convenient even though these loans often lead borrowers into
captive, protracted cycles of repeat borrowing. The warning signs
in this Section will serve to alert consumers to use caution when
dealing with predatory lenders.
2. The warning signs required by subsections (b) and (c) are
designed to make it clear to potential borrowers that the
language employed is a communication from [insert jurisdiction].
The only warning that is required by [insert jurisdiction] are the
exterior door signs required by subsection (c). However, if a
predatory lending facility chooses to display additional signage at
its business location, subsection (b) requires that these additional
signs include a warning statement echoing the warning provided
by official exterior door signs. This requirement is narrowly
tailored to match the degree to which a predatory lender
advertises at its location. The amount of required warning
signage matches the amount of predatory lending advertisement
chosen by the predatory lender.
3. Predatory lending facilities may have various types of preexisting signage. Subsection (b) does not require a single
authorized sign design, except as specified by the requirements of
this Section. To assist predatory lenders in complying with
subsection (b), this comment includes several illustrative
examples:
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a. Monument sign:

b. Marquee sign:

c. Roof sign:
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4. Subsections (d) and (e) give the Director discretion to design
the official [insert jurisdiction] exterior door sign. Official exterior
door signs are required on all exterior doors in order to prevent
predatory lenders from only placing the official exterior door sign
on a door not regularly used by customers entering the predatory
lending facility. The following illustration is an example of the
door sign design contemplated by [insert jurisdiction].

977

978

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012)
Section 700. Enforcement
(a) The remedies provided herein are cumulative and
supplementary and apply to licensees and unlicensed persons to
whom this Ordinance applies, even when they failed to obtain a
permit as required.
(b) The Director shall have the authority to bring suit to enforce
this Ordinance. A predatory lender found in violation of this
Ordinance shall be liable for a statutory penalty of $10,000 per
month per signage violation, together with any and all costs and
attorney fees incurred by [insert jurisdiction] in enforcing this
Ordinance.
(c) Any borrower who obtains a loan from a predatory lender in
violation of this ordinance shall have the right to enforce the
provision of this Ordinance through an individual or classrepresentative lawsuit. A predatory lender found to have violated
this Ordinance shall be liable to each borrower for actual,
consequential, and statutory damages of $2,000 for each signage
violation, together with costs and reasonable attorney fees, as
well as any appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief. The
remedies provided in this Section are not intended to be the
exclusive remedies available to borrowers nor to require
borrowers to exhaust any administrative remedies provided by
contract or any other applicable law.
(d) Any predatory lending facility operated, conducted, or
maintained in violation of this Ordinance or any other federal or
state law shall be, and hereby is, declared to be unlawful and a
public nuisance. The Director may, in addition to or in lieu of any
other remedies set forth in this Ordinance, commence an action
to enjoin, remove, or abate such nuisance in the manner provided
by law and shall take such other steps and apply to such court or
courts as may have jurisdiction to grant such relief.
(e) In each subsequent year following enactment of this
Ordinance, the Director shall adjust the statutory penalty and
damage provisions of subsections (b) and (c) to account for
inflation or deflation based on the Consumer Price Index as
calculated by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of
Labor Statistics or based on another comparable measure of price
change designated by the Director.
Section 800. Severability
If any portion of this Ordinance is determined to be invalid for
any reason by a final, non-appealable order of any court of this
state or of a federal court of competent jurisdiction, then it shall
be severed from this Ordinance. All other provisions of this
Ordinance shall remain in full force and effect.

